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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
(Dictionary of Military Terms, 1987) 
AIT—advanced individual training: after basic combat training, recruits normally 
attend a second phase of training to learn a specific military occupational 
specialty or skill. 
ASVAB—Armed Services Vocational Aptítude Battery: a standardized 
examination administered to potential recruits to judge their cognitive 
abilities. 
CA—combat arms: forces whose primary missions are to pgrticipate in combat. 
CS—combat support: forces whose primary mission is to furnish operational 
assistance for the combat forces. 
CSS—combat service support: forces whose primary missions are to provide 
support to the combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and 
logistics. 
Cold War: a state of international tension wherein politicai, economic, 
technological, sociological, psychological, paramilitary, ahd military 
measures short of overt conflict involving regular military forces are 
employed to achieve national objectives. 
DEP—delayed entry program: Army program in which a recruit can sign an 
enlistment contract to enter active military service, but can delay his report to 
the Military Entrance Processing Station for up to one year. This delay is 
offered as an incentive and allows the recruit to prepare mentally, physically, 
emotionally, and administratively for basic training. 
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drawdown; period following the end of the^Cold War in which the United Statesvj 
govemment drastically and continually reduced the size of its armed forces 
as a result of the reduced threat from the former Soviet Union, 
end strength; the number of soldiers serving on active-duty at the end of the fiscal 
year which ends on September 30th of each year. 
FY—fiscal year: year beginning each October 1st and ending each September 
30th used instead of the normal calendar year by government agencies. 
Gl—government lssue:items issued by the U.S. government. Common nickname 
for a U.S. soldier. 
GED—general equivalency diploma: a program taken by a non-high school 
diploma holder to verify possession of those minimal skills demmed essential 
and equivalent to a high school graduate. 
MEPS—milítary entrance processing station: place where a civilian contracted 
to enter the military service first reports and is administratively and legally 
inducted into military service. 
MOS—military occupational specialty: describes the specific military skills, 
attributes, and special knowledge in which an individual soldier has been or 
is being trained to perform his or her military duties. 
NPS—non-prior service: a soldier who has never previously served and been 
discharged from military service. 
operational tempo-the pace at which military forces are deployed and performing 
real-world missions, either in combat, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, 
humanitarian relief, or disaster relief. 
peace dlvldend: term generally used in the U.S. to describe the funds and 
resources provided as a result of the military drawdown following the 
breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. 
propensíty: tendency, inclination, or predisposition to do something. 
RA—Regular Army: forces of the active-duty Army, not belonging to the Army 
National Guard or the United States Army Reserve. 
USAR—United States Army Reserve: federal reserve forces of the United States 
Army, not belonging to the active forces or the Army National Guard. 
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ABSTRACT 
During the last few years, the United States Army has experienced great 
difficulties in recruiting and retaining sufficient numbers of quality soldiers, In 1999, 
the U.S. Army suffered its worst recruiting year in 20 years (Harper, 1999). The 
primary causes of the current recruiting crisis include the very robust U.S. economy, 
record-low unemployment leveis, and an ever-decreasing propensity for military 
service. 
To resolve the current recruiting crisis and remain the high-quality, all- 
volunteer force that it is today, the Army should abandon its traditional mass 
marketing methods and focus its limited resources in a more effective and 
economical manner. Current methods waste precious resources on segments that 
are extremely unlikely to serve in the Army. The Army cannot compete and win in 
ali segments; it must choose. 
It is my recommendation that, based on the analysis presented in this 
dissertation, that the U.S. Army, by adopting target marketing and a selective 
specialization marketing strategy, can identify, select, and target high-payoff 
segments where the Army possesses a competitive advantage. To achieve this 
goal, the Army must conduct a three-step process: market segmentation, market 
targeting, and market positioning. 
The Army must abandon its "shotgun approach" to recruiting American youth 
by developing customized marketing programs for each of its five recruiting 
brigades. Through target marketing, the U.S. Army can increase its recruiting 
effectiveness, reduce its advertising cqsts per recruit, and, ultimately, resolve the 
current recruiting crisis. 
KEY WORDS: segmentation, profiling, evaluation, target markets, positioning. 
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1 OVERVIEW 
1.1. Objectives 
The objectives of this dissertation are to explore specific mechanisms 
through which the United States Army can implement modem market segmentation 
techniques in order to decrease recruiting costs per recruit, meet recruiting goals, 
and allow the Army to remain an all-voluníeer force. More specifically, these 
objectives are: 
• Demonstrate that modern market segmentation methodology, specifically 
factor and cluster analysis, can be used to identify high-payoff target 
segments and increase the effectiveness of U.S. Army recruiting efforts. 
• Recommend methods to increase the U.S. Army's return on its marketing 
investments by reducing marketing expenditures per recruit. 
• Contribute to Army combat readiness by suggesting methods to resolve the 
current recruiting crisis and help the Army remain an all-volunteer force. 
1.2. Methodology 
The methodology used in this dissertation follows the three major steps 
deschbed by Philip Kotler in Chapter 9 of his book Marketing Management: 
Analysis, Planning, Implementation, and Control: 
1. Market Segmentation 
• Identify segmentation variables and segment the market. 
• Develop profiles of resulting segments. 
2. Market Taroetino 
• Evaluate the attractiveness of each segment. 
12 
• Select the target markets. 
3. Market Positionínq** 
• Identify possible positioning concepts for each target segment. 
• Select, develop, and communicate the chosen positioning concept. 
** Beyond the scopo ofthis dissertation. 
The first step involves gathering market data about today's youth and 
determining the economic, social, and politicai factors contributing to the current 
recruiting crisis. This can be done by gathering and analyzing the most commonly 
recognized surveys of America's youth: the Pentagon's annual Youth Attitude 
Tracking Survey (YATS), the Teenage Research Unlimited (TRU), the New Recruit 
Survey (NRS), Monitoring the Future from the University of Michigan, Sample 
Surveys Of Military Personnel, and Yankelevich Monitor Data. 
The second step is an analytical process involving the analysis and comparison 
of the various survey data to historical profiles of recruited soldiers. Current profiles 
can be compared with historical profiles of past Army enlistees in order to identify 
those market segments that have demonstrated an above average propensity to 
serve. Segments that have displayed, through the years, an above-average 
Propensity to serve should be chosen as the high-payoff segments where the Army 
should concentrate its marketing efforts. 
In the third step, using the customized profiles from each high-payoff target 
segment, positioning concepts can be developed to attract target segment 
members. 
Uíilizing this three-step process, the high propensity target segments can be 
identified in order to focus Army recruiting efforts, increase the Arrny^ recruiting 
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effectiveness, reduce marketing expenses, and, as a result, increase the Army's 
return on its recruiting investment. 
1.3. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations 
Using modern market segmentation theory, the Army's youth market was 
divided into 50 market segments. These 50 market segments were analized and 
profiled in order to accurately describe their distinctive attributes and 
characteristics. Next, the 50 segments were evaluated based on the last four years 
of enlistment contract production for the Army as a whole. Each of the 50 segments 
were then identified as belong to one of four quadrants: core segments, niche 
segments, low-production segments, and under-represented segments with high 
potential. 
After identifying and classifying these segments according to total Army 
production, they were then analized according to each of the Army^ five recruiting 
brigade's geographical area of responsibility. At this point, it became possible to 
identify specific core, niche, under-represented, and low-production segments 
relative to each recruiting brigade and its unique geographic region. 
The results of this analysis clearly demonstrate that, within each recruiting 
brigade area, there are specific core market segments that should be defended and 
^aintained and other niche segments that could be exploited. There are also 
under-represented segments that demonstrate great potential. In these under- 
represented areas, the Army must develop customized marketing campaigns, 
adapted specifically to the segment profiles previously developed, in order to attract 
rnembers of these segments. Lastly, certain segments were identified as extremely 
'ow-production segments that have traditionally exhibited a low-propensity towards 
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Army service. In these segments, the Army must not waste precious resources. In 
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other words, Army recruiters can try to recruit members from these segments, but 
should not "chase" these segments or expend any extraordinary effort in those 
segments. 
It is time for the Army to transform the way it recruits its soldiers. It is time for 
the Army to abandon its resource-intensive, wasteful mass marketing methods and 
implemení target marketing. The Army must not constaníly try to solve its recruiting 
problems by spending more money on higher pay and larger enlistment bonuses. 
These are expensive and short-term solutions. 
The Army must take a long-term view of solving its recruiting problems and 
become a more effective and efficient recruiter, as stressed recently by the Army's 
top civilian leader, Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera. 
\Nq must continue to be the most effective and efíicient organization 
^ ' 
of Arneríca (Anriy^s Health^iQSS). - 
In other words, the Army does not necessarily need to spend more money in 
order to solve its current recruiting crisis. The U.S. Army, just like any major 
Corporation in today's competitiva marketplace, must utilize modern marketing 
techniques to attract customers (America's qualified youth) to Ubuy" its product 
(service in the Army). 
Market segmentation would allow the Army to focus its limited resources in a 
c^ore effective and economical manner. The Army should abandon its traditional 
c^ass marketing strategy and implement a more concentrated marketing effort to 
15 
penetrate high-payoff market segments and reduce its recruiting costs. The U.S. 
/ 
Army should identify, select, and target high-payoff target segments. By using 
modern market segmentation theory, the U.S. Army can increase its recruiting 
effectiveness, reduce its advertising costs per recruit, and, ultimately, resolve its 
current recruiting crisis. 
1.4. Structure of Dissertation 
Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the U.S. Army and its missions in order to 
gain an appreciation for its size, composition, and where Army forces are located 
throughout the world. Next, the Army's role and mission within the United States 
national military strategy is explained. Chapter 2 also describes how the U.S. Army 
became an all-volunteer force and traces it evolution through the years. Beginning 
with the abolition of the draft by former U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1973, this 
section traces the high and low points of the all-volunteer Army and concludes with 
the status of the force today. 
The state of the today's youth market in America is the subject of Chapter 3. 
In Chapter 4 and Annex 1, the reader learns how the Army recruits its soldiers from 
the U.S. population. From recruiters to advertising to promotions and premiums, 
these sections describe the Army's traditional methods of mass marketing. 
In Chapter 5, current recruiting difficulties are described along with the 
principal causes of the Army's recruiting crisis. The Army's recruiting and retention 
Policies are based on the assumption that there is an unlimited supply of new 
recruits. That assumption is now in doubt because there are fewer American youths 
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inclined toward military service, less public understanding of what the military does, 
/ 
and many alternatives in an expanding economy to serving in the military. 
Recent responses by the Department of Defense and President Clinton's 
administration are discussed in Chapter 6. These short-term solutions to recruiting 
difficulties include better pay, more bonuses, lower recruiting standards, leadership 
emphasis within the Army to retain soldiers, and even discussion by some 
members of Congress about a return to the draft. 
Next, chapter 7 describes target marketing according to Philip Kotler. The 
five basic patterns of target marketing can be read about in greater detail at Annex 
2. Chapter 8 discusses the first step of the target marketing process; market 
segmentation. Market segmentation involves three stages; the Survey Stage, the 
Analysis Phase, and the Profiling Stage. This chapter discusses cluster analysis 
and segment profiling. Annex 3 contains a description of the 50 custom segments 
'dentified duhng this stage. 
Chapter 9 describes the process of market targeting, or more accurately 
segment evaluation. Segment evaluation allows the firm to target high-payoff 
segments. Chapter 10 summarizes the major findings and conclusions with 
recommendations following in Chapter 11. Closing comments can be found in 
Chapter 12. 
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2. INTRODUCTION TO THE ARMY AND US MISSIONS 
"7 
2.1. Slze, Composition, and Location 
As of October 1999, the U.S. Army consisted 0(479,100 active-duty soldiers 
with 146,000 of these soldiers staíioned or forward-deployed in 90 countries around 
the world (Shinseki, 1999). Elements of the U.S. Army are deployed around the 
world performing various and complex missions: Kosovo, Kuwait, Bósnia, Korea, 
Hawaii, Haiti, Honduras, and dozens of other locations. 
2.2. Role and Míssion 
The Army is a strategic instrument of national policy. Army soldiers enable 
America to fulfill its world leadership responsibilities of safeguarding its national 
interests, preventing global calamity, and making the world a safer place. The Army 
does this by finding peaceful solutions to the frictions between nation states, 
addressing the problems of human suffering, and, when required, fighting and 
winning the Nation's wars. 
The Army's deployment is the surest sign of America^ commitment to 
accomplishing any mission that occurs on land. The U.S. Army is a strategically 
deployable force. It can arrive at trouble spots quickly, engage as necessary, and 
de dominant across the spectrum of operations. The Army^ forces must be light 
enough to deploy, lethal enough to fight and win, and survivable enough to return 
safely home. These forces must be versatile enough to make peace or fight wars. 
They must be agile enough to transition from peacemaking to warfighting and back 
a9ain quickly (Shinseki, 1999). 
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2.3. Evolution of the "All-Volunteer Force" 
/ 
2.3.1. The Vietnam War Years: End of the Draft 
Throughout most of its history, the United States has had conscription only in 
wartime, The draft was first used in the Civil War, and, in this century, America has 
gone to war four times with the draft in place—World Wars I and II, Korea, and 
Vietnam. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II, the draft 
existed almost continuously for more than 30 years. Between 1941 and 1973, 4.2 
million men were drafted (Lippman, 1998), 
During the Vietnam War and its aftermath, American citizens had begun to 
question the fairness of who could and could not receive exemption from the draft. 
As a result, U.S. President Richard Nixon abolished the draft. On June 30, 1973, 
mandatory military service ended for American men as the United States military 
became an all-volunteer force (Lippman, 1998). 
2.3.2. The Reagan Years: Renewed Military Pride 
In the eaiiy 80s, U.S. President Ronald Reagan's military expansion and 
^odernization created the workfs most powerful and advanced military force. 
President Reagan^ supreme achievement, apart from winning the Cold War, was 
to
 preside over the revival of U.S. military power. Increased tensions with the Soviet 
Union gave the United States military a renewed sense of purpose and direction. 
President Reagan revived old-fashioned patriotism that had diminished during the 
19605 and 1970s and reversed some of the negative feelings associated with the 
military resulting from the Vietnam War. 
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By the middle of the 1980s, military commanders regarded the military force 
as the smartest, best educated, most trainable, and most disciplined in American 
history. During this period, the U.S. military did not have to sacrifice quality to attract 
the required quantity of recruits. 
2.3.3. The End of the Cold War 
On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall crumbled and the threat environment 
that the United States Army had trained and operated in for nearly 50 years 
changed drastically and instantly. Since the end of World War II, the U.S. Army had 
existed and trained as a forward-deployed Army prepared to thwart a large-scale 
conventional armored attack into Western Europe by the Soviet Union and other 
Warsaw Pact forces. After the fali of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the bipolar Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union 
thawed and the Army no longer faced a clearly defined and predictable enemy. The 
Army began to try to define the new world order and the future threat environment. 
Who were the potential enemies of and what were the potential threats to the 
United States and its national interests? 
After the Persian Gulf War, America began redeploying its forward-deployed 
troops in Germany and slowly transitioned to a force primarily based in the 
continental United States. The United States military began a lengthy process to 
ochieve cost savings through force reductions—dubbed the "peace dividend" by the 
American President and Congress. The Army began to focus not on pre-positioning 
forces throughout the world, but developing the capability to rapidly deploy forces 
anywhere in the world from the continental U.S.—developing a force-projection 
Army. 
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2.3,4. The Clinton Years 
/ 
A decade after President Reagan left office, the willingness to serve that he 
inspired has decreased. The military contraction of the 1990S. known as the 
"drawdown," reduced the active military force from 2.13 million to 1.36 million 
(Bacevich, 1999). However, the military services are still struggling to meet even 
these reduced recruiting requirements. 
Based on results of the latest annual Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS), 
fewer and fewer Americans are willing to serve in uniform. Since 1975, the 
Pentagon has used the YATS to chart the propensity of young Americans to enlist 
• * 
in the armed forces. Since 1989, the year that President Reagan left office, the 
figures have continued to decline; for some demographic groups, the decline has 
been remarkable. Since the Persian Gulf War, among ali 16-to-21-year-old men, 
the propensity to enlist has declined from 34 percent to 26 percent. For African- 
Americans, the lifeblood of the all-volunteer force, that propensity has dropped from 
54 percent in 1989 to 30 percent in 1998. This decrease is even more significant 
when one considers that 30 percent of the Army is black while only 12 percent of 
the comparable pool of the civilian work force is black. Only 55 percent of the Army 
ls
 White, whereas the comparable civilian work force is 72 percent white (Bacevich, 
1999). 
During the years of the military drawdown, this reduced propensity seemed 
•nconsequential since the Army faced a surplus of soldiers and recruits. The focus 
was not on attracting new recruits, but reducing the number of soldiers then serving 
the active-duty Army. Additionally, immediately following the Persian Gulf War, 
there was a brief surge in enlistments and the Army could be quite selective about 
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who it accepting into service. There were more than enough willing and qualified 
/ 
applicants. As Secretary of Defense William Cohen noted in his annual report for 
1998, "a sufficient number of young men were interested in the military to allow the 
Services to meet reduced recruiting goals." 
However, today, with the drawdown complete and annual recruiting 
requirements therefore increasing, Secretary Cohe^s statement is no longer true. 
As the drawdown ended and the recruiting requirements began to rise once again, 
the reduced propensity to serve among America's youth became a visible problem. 
At a time when the Army^ recruiting requirements were increasing, the number of 
young Americans interested in military service was decreaslng. In 1998 and 1999, 
the Army began to feel the impact of the current recruiting environment. Recruiting 
the required number of high-quality recruits had begun to impact on current and 
future readiness. 
In 1998, during his last public appearance on Capitol Hill, former U.S. Army 
Chief of Staff General Reimer emphasized the significance of the transition period 
from the drawdown years to those of sustaining the recruiting requirements of the 
now smaller, but stabilized Army. Reimer noted that the end of this century marks a 
significant turning point—a year of transition. Eight successive years of drawing 
down the force and 13 years of straight decline in real buying power were trend 
'ines that the Army can no longer sustain if it is going to maintain the trained and 
ready Army that the Nation requires. Budget cuts and recruiting challenges have 
provoked severe manning shortages in the Army and contributing a lower state of 
personnel readiness. In other words, the all-volunteer Army is running out of 
22 
volunteers. As General Reimer said, "We must chart a new direction." (Fiscal 2000, 
/ 
1999) 
2.3.5. Today's Force 
Now it has been more than 25 years since the United States has used the 
draft. America's all-volunteer armed forces of today are different organizations from 
those of 1973; smaller, better-educated, more technologically advanced, and much 
more dependent on women to fill essential jobs (Lippmann, 1998). For sénior 
military leaders, initially hostile to proposals to end the draft, this reliance on 
volunteers has long been a source of pride. For politicians, .the all-volunteer force 
has been a godsend, enabling them to field a powerful military while freeing them 
from imposing the politically unpopular draft (Bacevich, 1999). 
The quality of the average soldier has risen dramatically since the draft was 
abolished and the all-volunteer force created. Through the years, the Army has 
maintained statistics on its recruits and how they have scored on standardized 
entrance exams. Those that score in the top category are considered "high quality." 
'
n
 1997, the latest scores available, 62,6 percent of recruits scored as "high quality." 
Contrast this percentage with the scores of recruits from 1977, during the very first 
years of the all-volunteer force, when only 27.1 percent of recruits scored as "high 
quality" (Figure 1). Although these numbers have slipped from the high point of 73.1 
Percent reached in 1990, today's soldiers are still considered among the very best 
that the Army has had serving since the end of the draft in 1973 (Levins, 1999). 
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Figure 1 - Percentago of High-Q^iality Reemite—1977 to 1997 
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IV 
THE STATE OF TODAVS YOUTH MARKET 
National cynicism, less patriotism, the '90s lifestyle, a declining sense of 
adventure, and a high-standards armed forces that is 60 percent married are ali 
factors contributing to the crisis in combat readiness of America's armed services. 
The proliferation of information services is creating what many call a "global village" 
ln
 which the world is becoming smaller in many ways. Youth today are more 
e
xposed to other cultores than ever before and, in many senses, the Internet is 
contributing to a merging and blending of various cultures. 
3.1. Society Becoming Less Connected to Military 
According to Lieutenant Colonel Hilary Evers III, commander of the 
Baltimore, Maryland-based Recruiting Battalion, late-20th century American 
cynicism is a big obstacle. "Kids are pretty much the same as they were 40 years 
a9o—they listen to Mom and Dad when it comes to military service." But, he said, 
P^rents " are a lot more cynical about military service than adults were 40 years 
24 
ago." For the first time since World War II, fathers are coming of age with no 
/ 
experience in the military to pass along to sons and daughters. As World War II 
veterans die at the rate of 1,000 a week, only 6 percent of Americans under age 65 
have seen military service of some kind (Omicinski, 1999). 
Additionally, according to Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera, the fact that 
his own baby-boom generation has failed to pass along patriotic values is further 
complicating matters. Caldera states that America's youth are "uncomfortable 
talking about patrioíism or about obligations due to the country...[there is] a whole 
generation that has^t had those experiences." Caldera adds that it is a cultural 
thing that would be hard to change. He says that today's youth "ca^t stand the 
thought of their independence being taken away. They don't see that the gain— 
getting hungry, cold, and wet—as being worth the pain" (Omicinski, 1999). 
3.2. The Information Age Youth: Generations X and Net 
The recruiting climate and the cultural psychology of the targeí audience 
have changed according to James Siegel, sénior vice president and account 
director at Young and Rubicam, Inc., the Army^ New York City-based contracted 
^dvertising agency (New Look, 1998). Computer-literate young people of today's 
'frtormation Age" enjoy watching colorful, fast-paced action and video-game-like 
graphics. 
The Generation X population (born after 1964) is more self-oriented and less 
H^otivated by a desire to serve their country. Socialization—meaning the process of 
lnternalizing Army values, ethics, and attitudes of these youths—will be an 
lrriPortant challenge for the Army in the coming years, The Army will be faced with 
e difficult task of socializing young men and women whose value system may 
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diverge considerably from the traditional Army ethos. On the positive side, 
Generation X men and women seek adventure, fun, and physical risk—areas thaí 
are very compatible with Army training. Also, they easily accept the authority of the 
President, are comfortable with the use of computers and information technology, 
and believe they must work and study hard to achieve success (YATS, 1997). 
3.3. Demographic Mismatches: Who is Today^ Soldier? 
The average soldier in America's Army íoday is 26 years old and 63 percent 
are married. More than 95 percent of Army soldiers have a high school diploma and 
over 20 percent have attended college. Over 85 percent of the Army is male. Only 
55 percent of the soldiers in the Army are white (USAREC VIP Briefing, 1999). 
There are several segments of the population that are "under-represented" in 
the military. For example, Hispanics make up 11 percent of the U.S. population of 
18 to 44-year-olds, but make up only 6.3 percent of today's military. Even more 
s
'gnificant is the fact that among the Army's prime recruiting market, young people 
ages 17 to 21, Hispanics make up roughly 14 percent of the population, but only 10 
Percent of new recruits. According to U.S. Census Bureau projections, Hispanics 
are expected to make up 18 percent of 12 to 44-year-olds by the year 2020, This 
means that the Army would need to triple the proportion of Hispanics currently 
Serving in its ranks in order to match the civilian population (Jordan, 1999). 
Figures 2 through 5 on the following pages describe the demographics of the 
youth contracted as Army recruits or enlistees (Zsido, 1999). 
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Figura 2- New Army Recrult Demographics—Race / Ethniclty 
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4, THE ARMY'S TRADITIONAL MARKETING APPROACH 
7  
Annex 1 describes in detail how the U.S. Army recruits its enlisted personnel 
and describes the various components of the Army's marketing program. 
4.1. Mass Marketing 
Over the years, the U.S. Army has utilized a very typical mass marketing 
approach to attracting recruits. In traditional mass marketing, the seller promotes 
one product for ali buyers. Henry Ford epitomized this marketing strategy when he 
produced his Model-T Ford automobile for ali American buyers. Henry Ford often 
quipped that consumers could have the car uin any color as long as it was black." 
In many ways, the Army has recruited for many years with the same "as long 
as it was black" mentality. The Army has marketed itself as a "one size fits ali" 
product. The Army normally launches national television and magazine advertising 
campaigns instead of campaigns adapted for specific segments or regions. In other 
words, the Army will run the same television commercial ad nationwide with no 
adaptations made for different sub-segments of the major mass market. 
4.2. A Massíve and Diverse Market 
Clearly, with a population of over 272 million and an area of more than 9.3 
"lillion square kilometers (World in Figures, 1999), the United States represents a 
broad and diverse population, both demographically and geographically. The target 
Market for the United States Army is described as 17 to 21-year-olds, with the 17 to 
2l-year-old male population, numbering 9.9 million in 1999, identified as the prime 
market. 
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The total number of 17 to 21-year-olds in the United States in 1999 is over 
/ 
20 million. Obviously, such a large group could be sub-divided into numerous 
segments in which each segment possessed shared or similar characteristics, 
desires, or attributes. These segments, having different characteristics and 
attributes, would theoretically respond to different marketing mix combinations. 
A youth from an educated, affluent family living in New York City probably 
views Army service and its employment opportunities from a different perspective 
than a youth from a working class, uneducated farming family living in a rural town 
ln
 southern Geórgia. One youth may join the Army to escape small-town life and its 
'^ited opportunities. He or she may be attracted by the challenges and rewards of 
a
 career of military service. Another youth may view the Army as short-term 
ernployment providing valuable training, leadership experience, and college money 
to
 continue educational pursuits after the Army. One youth sees the Army as the 
end; another sees the Army as the means to an end. With this simple example, it is 
easy to see how different people view Army service differently, looking for different 
Job attributes and having different motivatíons for serving in the Army. 
4.3. Limited Promotion of Army Opportunities 
In addition, instead of promoting the hundreds of diverse jobs that it offers, 
tbe Army has promoted itself using only a few limited perspectives. For many years, 
Army advertising has shown almost exclusively combat soldiers marching on the 
Qround, jumping out of planes, or charging across a battlefield in armored vehicles. 
^his type of advertising appeals to those seeking adventure and action as a 
baditional combat soldier. However, this narrow focus fails to project to American 
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youth the plethora of opportunities, benefits, experience, and rewards that the Amny 
/ 
offers in other military occupational specialties. 
Although the very heart of the Army and its mission is the combat arms 
soldier, the majority of the Army consists of combat support and combat service 
support personnel performing various criticai functions in support of the combat 
arms soldier. It is in the combat support and combat service support career fields 
that the Army offers exceptional technical skill training and experience along with 
generous educational opportunities. The Army offers a wide variety of job 
opportunities. However, the Army has failed to promote these less glamorous, but 
diverse specialties to its broad target audience. 
* 
4.4. Different Segments...Same Message 
The Army's undifferentiated marketing campaigns ignore market segment 
differences and tend to offer only one aspect of its product to the market as a 
whole. Gardner and Levy, while admitting that "some brands have very skillfully 
built up reputations of being suitable for a wide variety of people," also noted that "it 
,s
 not easy for a brand to appeal to stable lower-middle-class people and at the 
same time to be interesting to sophisticated, intellectual upper-middle-class 
^
uyers...lt is rarely possible for a product or brand to be ali things to ali people" 
(1995, p.37). 
If market segments view military service from various perspectives and often 
Seek different job attributes from potential employers, why should the Army use 
mass marketing techniques and promote itself in the same way to ali segments 
^thin the market? The answer is that it should not. Are certain segments of this 
rnarket more likely to be attracted to military service and thus have a higher 
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propensity to join the Army? The answer is yes. Theoretically, it should be easier 
/ 
and less expensive for the Army to attract members of these high propensity 
segments, 
& CURRENT CRISIS THREATENS ALL-VOLUNTEFR FORnF 
Ten years ago, the Army numbered over 780,000 active-duty soldiers and 
around 300,000 soldiers in Army Reserve units. However, in 1999, the Army had 
trouble trying to meet recruiting goals to meet its end strength target of 480,000 
active-duty soldiers. In 1989, the Army consisted of 18 divisions. Today there are 
only io divisions. Of those 10 divisions, two have been rated unfit for battle 
according to the Army's combat readiness rating standards, primarily due to a lack 
of authorized soldiers (Coryell, 1999). In other words, the Army's current recruiting 
orisis has become a combat readiness issue and, perhaps more importantly, a real 
fhreat to the continued status of the Army as an all-volunteer force. 
5.1. Background 
During the last few years, the United States Army has experienced great 
difficulties in recruiting and retaining sufficient numbers of quality soldiers. In fact, 
during fiscal year 1999, the U.S. Army suffered its worst recruiting year in 20 years, 
fall
'ng short by about 7,600 enlistees for the fiscal year (Harper, 1999). The Army is 
darely reaching its congressíonally mandated force levei of 480,000 soldiers. With 
normal turnover, the Army will need to recruit 80,000 young men and women in the 
CUrrent fiscal year, which began October 1, 1999. This requirement is nearly 13,000 
H^ore than the number recruited last year (Komarow, 1999). 
On November 4, 1999, members of the U.S. Commission on National 
Security in the 21 st Century gave their testimony before the United States House of 
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Representatives Armed Services personnel subcommittee. During the testimony, 
/ 
the personnel subcommittee chairman, Representative Steve Buyer of Indiana, 
warned that even if Congress decides to increase the Army^ force structure, it is 
not clear that the Army could attract the number and quality of people it needs given 
the current recruiting and retention problems. Charles Moskos, a Northwestern 
University sociology professor specializing in military personnel issues, said the 
military is having severe problems getting quality people into the service. He warns 
that the problems could become even worse in the next century unless the military 
comes up with a newway of filling the ranks (Maze, 1999). 
Worse yet, in a disturbing statement on November 10, 1999, current U.S. 
* 
Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, revealed that two division commanders 
out of the Army's 10 active-duty divisions recently assessed their divisions' combat 
readiness as a uC-4," the lowest of the Army^ four combat-readiness grades. 
Shinseki explained that the problems within these two divisions do not lie with 
equipment or troop training, but are due to personnel problems (Army Confirms 
Sombat Readiness, 1999). "Current concerns about readiness are the result of two 
of
 the Army^ 10 combat divisions reporting a lower-than-normal readiness levei for 
the month of October [1999] in the category of personnel availability," said a sénior 
U
 S. Department of Defense official at the November 10, 1999, briefing at the 
Rentagon (Gilmore, 1999). 
5.2. Factors Contributing to the Recruiting Crisis 
Effective solutions to the personnel challenges currently facing the Army 
must be developed and be implemented quickly. However, before discussing 
Potential responses, the causes of the current problem should be identified. The 
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primary causes of the current recruiting crisis include the very robust U.S. economy, 
/ 
enduring, record-low unemployment leveis, and an ever-decreasing propensity for 
military service. In addition, fewer qualified applicants, high attrition rates, an ever- 
growing perception of eroding compensation and benefits, fewer veterans, and an 
increased operational tempo are exacerbating the problem. Each of the above 
causes will now be discussed in greater detail. 
5.2.1. Robust Economy and Low Unemployment 
A strong economy with its lure of higher salaries with fewer personal 
sacrifices and risks presents a formidable obstacle to the Army's current recruiting 
efforts. America's expanding economy and a 28-year low in unemployment 
Provides every young American numerous employment options after high school or 
college. It also affords every outgoing soldier who decides to leave Army service 
the opportunity for immediate employment with little risk. Soldiers in high-tech 
aviation, electronics, engineering, medicai, and computer fields enjoy many high- 
Paying, attractive job opportunities. 
5.2.2. Decreased Propensity to Serve 
According to Lieutenant Colonel James Sullivan, marketing officer for the 
U S. Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, there are other factors 
that hinder current enlistment efforts in addition to a strong economy that provides 
^ore options for the people the Army wants. There has also been a decreased 
Uriderstanding of the value of military service since the end of the Gold War. With 
the elimination of the threat of a major çonventional conflict in Europe with Warsaw 
pact forces, many young people do not place the same importance on military 
service as during the Gold War (New Look, 1998). 
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The Army has had to commit more resources in recent years in order to 
/ 
attract America^ youth to military service. The cost of recruiting each individual 
soldier has more than doubled since 1986 from $5,300 to over $11,000 today, 
representing the challenge of recruiting from a population that is less willing to 
volunteer for military service (Fiscal 2000, 1999). 
5.2.3. Fewer Qualified Applicants 
Although recruiting requirements have fluctuated dramatically during the 
decade-long drawdown, the Army has reached a steady state strength of around 
480,000 active duty soldiers. In fiscal year 1999, the Army had a recruiting goal of 
enlisting 72,550 recruits, but only reached 98.8 percent of this goal. Fiscal year 
2000's recruiting goal promises to be even more challenging with a recruiting goal 
of
 82,923 to maintain its steady state strength (Jordan, 1999). 
The task of recruiting is becoming increasingly problematic as the Army 
faces unprecedented competition from the private sector for the same high-quality 
People. Worse still, only 13 out of 100 recruiting-age youth are fully-qualified to join 
fhe Army. In contrast, more than 50 out of this same 100 are qualified to go to 
college or are already there (Ohle, 1999). Since virtually ali of the youth the military 
Seeks are also qualified to go to college, the Army faces unprecedented challenges 
^tracting quality youth in sufficient numbers. 
5.2.4. High Attrition Rates 
Historically, of those recruits who were qualified for service and signed an 
erilistment contract, over 30 percent of them fail to make it through their first 
erilistment term. However, the Army's first term attrition rate has been on the rise— 
Cresting at 41 percent (Ohle, 1999). Obviously, this percentage is too high and 
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wastes money by bringing in and trainin^ many recruits who fail to fulfill theifí; 
enlistment obligation and never become productive soldiers in the Army. In other 
words, the Army never receives a return on its investment from many of its 
enlistees. Therefore, the Army must develop a better system for attracting and 
identifying high-quality recruits that demonstrate a high probability of completing 
their entire enlistment term. 
5.2.5. Eroding Compensation and Benefits 
According to the 7,h Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, there is a 13,5 
Percent pay differential between the civilian sector and the military (Military 
Recruitment, 1999). Today^ soldiers are concerned about the reduced value of 
fetirement benefits that they will receive under the Military Retirement Reform Act of 
1986, commonly known as Redux. Redux has had a very negative effect on 
recruiting and retention by reducing military retirement pay at 20 years of service 
írom 50 percent to 40 percent. The effects of the Redux plan are only now 
^ecoming significant as the first generation of servicemembers affected by the 
reduced package will begin retiring from service during the next few years. As seen 
ln
 Pigure 6, since 1992, satisfaction with retirement benefits has fallen from 61.8 
Percent to 39 percent for officers and from 44.8 percent to 28.1 percent for enlisted 
Soldiers (Fiscal 2000, 1999). 
The intent of the Military Reform Act of 1986 (Redux) was to encourage 
Service members to remain in the military after 20 years with the goal of the higher 
retirement pay achieved at 30 years. The real value of the retirement benefit 
Package offered to today's service members is actually 25 percent less than the 
retirement packages offered under previous systems. In sharp contrast to the 
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original intent of Redux, there has been^yery little evidence that the 40 percent 
retired pay after 20 years has actually motivated many service members to remain 
until 30 years to achieve 50 percent retired pay (Fiscal 2000, 1999). 
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According to the most recent Personnel Pay Survey, almost 70 percent of 
respondents indicated that retirement pay was an important factor in their 
career decision. The most disturbing aspect of the survey reports that 84 percent of 
respondents under the Redux plan felt that the 40 percent retirement pay they had 
to
 iook forward to after 20 years of active duty service was insufficient to make them 
want to remain until they were retirement eligible (Military Recruitment, 1999). 
5.2.6. Declining Population of Veterans 
The gap between the military and the American public is likely to grow since 
fewer and fewer of those citizens will be veterans in the near future. The number of 
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living World War II veterans continues to decline, reducing the desirable influence 
they have historically had on the decisions of young Americans to serve in the 
military (Military Recruitment, 1999). Additionally, a majority of the veterans from 
the Vietnam War had such a negative experience while serving that they 
sometimes discourage young men and women from joining the military. America 
has not been involved in a large-scale war of long duration since the World War II, 
Korea, and Vietnam Wars produced millions of veteran service members. In fact, 
the Army has not been as small as it is today since before the Japanese attacked 
Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the U.S. entered World War II. 
In Congress, forexample, most members have no military experience. In the 
House of Representativos, the proportion of members who wore a uniform has 
declined from 40 percent in 1993 to 30 percent in 1998. In the Senate, the 
Percentage fell from 61 percent to 48 percent. President Bill Clinton is one of the 
0n|y presidents from the 20,h century who has no military experience (Lippman, 
1998). 
According to Theodore A. Wilson, a military historian at the University of 
Kansas, most American citizens today are not affected by the-military experience, 
and increasingly, their parents' lives weren't affected by military service either. The 
Cross-section of American society experiencing military service is becoming 
narrower and increasingly limited to the less educated and less financially fortunate 
(New Look, 1998). 
5.2.7. Increased Operational Tempo 
As a guest speaker at a recent Veterans Day ceremony, retired Air Force 
^
ajor General Earl Peck warned the audience that American society was ignoring 
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its military at a time when those forces are being asked to do much more with 
dwindling troops. "Americans, I think, are unaware that ifs still a very dangerous 
world," Peck said. As evidence, he pointed to missile tests by North Korea, the 
availability of weapons in the former Soviet republics, and the increasing might of 
China (Coryell, 1999). 
The Army^ operations tempo is 300 percent of its Cold War average, 
despite a decline across the Army of 34 percent of end strength. While President 
Reagan deployed U.S. forces 17 times during his eight-year presidency and 
president Bush 14 times during his four years in office, President Clinton has 
ordered U.S. forces overseas more than 46 times (Coryell, 1999). Defense analysts 
do not expect the pace of operational deployments to slow appreciably in the years 
ahead. On any given day, the Army maintains over 122,000 soldiers forward 
stationed in Europe, the Pacific, Korea, and other criticai areas. Additionally, the 
^
rrny has over 28,000 soldiers deployed daily in shaping operations around the 
^rld. Over 6,000 soldiers are deployed in support of Task Force Falcon in Kosovo 
0Perations. Another 6,200 soldiers are in Bósnia as part of Task Force Eagle in 
SuPport of Joint Forge (Readiness, 1999). 
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army has assumed many diverse 
^'ssions that involve more than traditional warfighting. Today, the spectrum of 
0Perations extends in intensity down from major theater wars to peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement, disaster relief, and other types of stability and support 
operations. Since 1989, the Army has participated in 3,435 major deployments, 
Tany of which are small-scale contingencies in support of U.S. national security 
lnterests. In nearly ali these deployments, the Army has provided the bulk of 
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deployed forces. In many cases, soldiers remain on the ground today shaping the 
operational environment. 
ÍL RECENT RESPONSES TO THE RECRUITING CRISIS 
In recení months, the recruiting situation for the United States Army has 
become a crisis situation. The Army only met its required endstrength in fiscal year 
1999 due to superb retention of current soldiers, not to bringing in new recruits to 
replace those leaving the service. The seriousness of the situation is becoming 
quite clear as many sénior Army leaders and members of Congress have recently 
expressed their concerns. These sénior leaders claim that the 480,000-soldier 
active Army is being stressed due to personnel and budget cuts and is 
overextended because of continuing global deployments to places like Bósnia, 
Kosovo, and Korea. The Army's top civilian leader, Secretary of the Army Louis 
Caldera, recently acknowledged these concerns. There is no question that we 
have been feeling some strain after 14 years of declining budgets" (Army^ Health, 
1998). On November 8,1999, in a memorandum addressed to every general officer 
in
 the Army, the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric K. Shinseki, stated that recruiting 
ls
 the number-one mission on his essential task list (Dickey, 1999). 
Many sénior government leaders consider current leveis of defense 
sPending to be dangerously low. In fact, the total budget for the Department of 
Cefense currently accounts for less than 3 percent of the United States' Gross 
Ccmestic Product—the lowest levei of spending on defense since before the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II. The fiscal year 1999 budget 
capped 13 straight years of decline in real buying power for the U.S. Army (Fiscal 
2000, 1999) 
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Curiously enough, given the limited defense budgets of recent years, the 
initial responses to the recruiting difficulties have been addressed with increased 
spending in the form of better pay and increased enlistment bonuses. In addition, 
the Army has lowered its education standards for new recruits, implemented a 
Hometown Recruiter Program, and greatly emphasized both retention and 
recruiting to Army leaders. The most drastic response has come from a few 
Congressmen who are advocating the return of mandatory military service—the 
draft. 
6.1. Better Pay and More Bonuses 
With the Army missing its recruiting goal in fiscal year 1999 and internai 
Army documents predicting that the service will most likely fali short again in fiscal 
year 2000, Army leaders are looking for solutions (Scarborough, 1999). Leaders 
lnside the Pentagon and President Clinton's administration have proposed 
straightforward solutions: better pay, improved benefits, and more advertising to 
^arket the "product". In other words, they advise addressing the issue by increased 
sPending. However, with the defense budget decreased by 40% since President 
clinton took office, increased funding for recruiting is limited. The Army already 
sPends more than $11,000 in recruiting costs for each enlistee contracted— 
ttiousands more per recruit than the other military services spend (Harper, 1999). 
The Army did achieve an end strength of 479,100 active duty soldiers, well 
Wlthin its mandated end strength thanks to congressional interest in and 
Subsequent passage of the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Budget. The FY 2000 
defense Budget included a large pay raise, pay table reform, and retirement reform 
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•egislation. Congress hoped that this legislation would help the Army, at least in the 
/ 
short-term, recruit and retain quality soldiers, 
However, despite the huge packet of Army guarantees—sign-up bonuses of 
$3,000 to $11,000; $50,000 in college money; guaranteed repayment of up to 
$65,000 in college loans for some sought-after military specialties, there were not 
very many young people who decided to try out the Army "product" (Omicinski, 
1999). As a result, on November 18, 1999, the Army increased enlistment benefits 
to record leveis, hoping to attract more young people into uniform. The newest 
•nducements include a near doubling of the signing bónus, from $11,000 to 
$20,000, for recruits agreeing to enter certain military occupational specialties 
(Komarow, 1999), 
The Army has also loosened its criteria for its "quick ship" bonuses. The 
Army pays quick ship bonuses to recruits who leave for basic training within 30 
^ays of signing their initial enlistment contract. Previously, the Army had only been 
Paying these bonuses to recruits who scored in the top three enlistment test 
categories. However, the Army recently began offering these bonuses to recruits in 
a
 lower test category as well. Recruits from this lower category have traditionally 
^
ad higher attrition rates than recruits from the top three categories (Military 
^acruitment, 1999). Therefore, if attrition rates remain unchanged, a higher 
Parcentage of the recruits who drop out will have already been paid bonuses, thus 
further increasing the Army's recruiting costs. 
6.2. Reduced Standards for High School Graduates 
The Army maintained a goal throughout the 1980s that 95 percent of ali 
racruits would be high school graduates—as opposed to holders of a general 
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development education (GED). During the period between 1987 and 1996, the 
percentage of traditional high school diploma graduates remained fairly steady at 
about 94 percent (Military Recruitment, 1999). However, given today's difficult 
recruiting environment, the Army reduced this requirement to only 90 percent. Ten 
percent of recruits can now have the alternate credential—the GED (Komarow, 
1997). 
6.3. Hometown Recruiter Program 
One particularly successful response was the Army's aggressive use of the 
Hometown Recruiting Assistance Program. In this program, the Army selects new 
soldiers just out of advanced individual training (AU) and then sends them home for 
a short period to talk to young people in their neighborhoods about the advantages 
the Army has offered to them. This program generated over 30,000 recruiting 
contacts by the end of fiscal year 1999 (Readiness, 1999). 
6.4. Leadership Emphasls on Retention and Recruiting 
Another successful short-term response was the tremendous effort by 
'eaders—non-commissioned officers and officers—to reenlist soldiers in record 
^umbers. The retention rate, an indication of increased soldier job satisfaction, was 
the most significant factor enabling the Army to meet its end strength goals 
(Headiness, 1999). 
6.5. Congress Threatens to Reinstate the Draft 
Recruiting and retention have been so poor during the last few years that 
many congressmen are now discussing reinstating the draft to correct the severe 
Manpower shortages and to ensure that ali Americans share the burden of service. 
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Nearly ali of the Army^ sénior leadership vigorously oppose the return of 
/ 
mandatory service after witnessing the qualitative revolution in the Army after the 
draft was abolished. 
L, TARGET MARKETING AS AN EFFECTIVE SQLUTION 
The responses by the Clinton administration and sénior Army leaders can be 
categorized as near-term solutions at best. Despite increased enlistment bonuses, 
reduced standards, and other "quick-fixes," the recruiting crisis is not disappearing. 
If
 anything, it is getting worse since the Army's recruiting expenses per recruit are 
climbing and the Army is still failing to meet its recruiting goals. 
Tha Army continues to spend 
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The Army^ marketing approach is ineffective and wastes precious 
•"esources. With its "shotgun blast", mass marketing approach, the Army is using a 
0ne size fits ali" advertising campaign: continuously launching commercials 
nationwide with no regional adaptation. In a country of over 270 million people and 
fiearly 9.4 million square kilometers, this approach lacks any type of focus. Just like 
ar|y other firm in corporate America, the Army must identify which market segments 
11
 '
s
 going to compete in and develop marketing strategies to succeed in those 
target segments. 
To increase the number of American youth recruited into the Army and, at 
same time, reduce costs per recruit, the Army must implement a more effective 
marketing campaign. This paper suggests target marketing as a solution. Target 
^fketing would allow the Army to increase the number of youth recruited and 
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decrease costs by focusing precious marketing resources on high-payoff segments. 
In other words, the Army must identify and focus more effectively its limited 
advertising dollars on these "high-payoff' segments. The key to this approach is 
identifying those groups of young people that have an above-average propensity to 
serve in the military. After identifying these high-payoff segments, Army marketers 
could create custom profiles of each segment and fashion specific advertising 
campaigns to reach specific target segments. 
The Army must abandon the 'one size fíts ali" marketing mentality. The Army 
should adopt a 'different sizes for different segments' approach 
and only try to Tit' cartam, selected segmentsunot ali ofthem. 
7.1. Target Marketing Explained 
Markets consist of buyers who differ in numerous ways. According to Philip 
Kotler of Northwestern University, companies that decide to operate in a broad 
fdarket eventually recognize that they normally cannot serve ali customers in that 
f^arket, The decision to compete in a broad market normally involves targeting 
cnstomers who are too numerous and diverse in their purchasing requirements. 
'
nstead of trying to serve too many diverse customers, a company should normally 
attempt to identify those market segments that it can serve most effectively. In other 
Words, by adopting a strategy of target marketing, a company selectively chooses 
'te niarkets and serves them better than the competition. 
In target marketing, a seller fírst divides the major market into identifiable 
market segments, each wiíh distinct characteristics. Next, the seller targets one or 
more of these target segments, developing products and marketing programs 
sPecifically adapted and tailored to each segment. Instead of a marketing program 
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directed toward the major market as a whole (a "shotgun" approach), the seller can 
/ 
focus on the customers whom they have the greatest chance of satisfying (a "rifle" 
approach) (Kotler, 1997). 
7.2. Target Market Selection Patterns 
After identifying segments with unique, identifiable, and distinguishable 
characteristics, traits, and attributes, the segments must be evaluated, each one 
individually, for attractiveness. According to Kotler, different market segments 
should be evaluated in terms of two factors: the overall attractiveness of the 
segment, and the organizatio^s objectives and available resources (Kotler, 1997). 
First, the organization must determine whether or not the segment has the 
desired characteristics that make it attractive, such as size, profitability, growth, 
©conomies of scale, appropriate levei of risk, and so on. For example, for the Army, 
the segment must consist of a sufficient number of qualified youth (medically, 
Physically, mentally, and psychologically) that make the Army^ marketing efforts in 
that segment worthwhile. 
Second, the organization must consider whether investing in the segment 
^akes financial sense given its resources. In the Army^ case, these resources are 
'•rnited and are provided by the U.S. govemment. The firm should seek to target 
those segments in which it can provide a superior offer to members of that segment 
^hen compared with a competitor. The Army's competitors are not only civilian 
eaiployers, but also the other military services of the United States, who are 
competing for the same American youth. 
Having evaluated different segments, the firm must then decide which 
segments to compete in and how it plans to serve those chosen segments. In other 
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words, it must decide, given the potential segmente, which segments it will choose 
/ 
to target. 
Philip Kotler describes tive different patterns of target market selection 
(1997) 
1. Single Segment Concentration 
2. Selective Specialization 
3. Product Specialization 
4. Market Specialization 
5. Full Market Coverage 
These tive patterns of target market selection are described in greater detail in 
* 
Annex 2. 
7.3. The Advantages of Target Marketing 
For the U.S. Army, target marketing offers several advantages over its 
kaditional mass marketing approach. With target segments, the Army can select 
specific job attributes, benefits, training, or experiences that the Army offers and 
Pfomote them to the target segment most likely to value those aspects of Army 
service. The Army can adapt its marketing message and distribution channel for 
that message to match the customized profile developed for the specific target 
segment. By promoting aspects of Army service that are most important to that 
specific target segment and presenting them in such a way that attracts the interest 
and attention of that segment, the Army can distinguish itself from other employers 
Competing to employ the same target segment members. 
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specific high-payoff segments, lha Army minimizas the non-productlve costs 
associated wlth advertislng In segments whose members 
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ex/?tó/f an extreme ly low propenslty. 
Target marketing requires that the marketing team take three major steps. 
The first step is market segmentation. 
MARKET SEGMENTAHON 
Michael Porter of Harvard University (1998) defines market segmentation as ■% 
the identification of differences in buyer needs and purchasing behavior, thus 
allowing a firm to serve segments that match its capabilities with distinct marketing 
Programs. According to Wheelen and Hunger (1998), through market research, 
corporations are able to use market segmentation to determine which segments 
they will seek to serve and to position their products in the most advantageous 
f^anner possible againsí their competitors. For the Army, this means defining who 
they can serve best; better than civilian employers and even better than the Navy, 
Force, or Marine Corps. The task is to identify those segments of the U.S. 
Population that view serving in the Army in a positive way and see the Army as 
eaiployer offering beneficiai training, pay, experience, and benefits. 
A market segment consists of a large identifiable group within a market. 
^
egment marketing recognizes that consumers differ in their demographics, 
9eographical locations, attitudes, wants, and habits. However, it is obviously too 
e)(pensive for a company to try to customize its marketing mix to each individual 
Consumer. There is a compromise between mass marketing and individual 
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marketing: segment marketing: targeting selected segments through market 
/ 
segmentation, 
Market segmentation is achieved by first identifying and profiling these 
distinct groups of consumers. Consumers belonging to specific segment exhibit 
similar characteristics, wants, and needs. They are similar, not identical. Thus 
segment marketing does not have the precision of individual marketing but it is 
much more precise than mass marketing (Anderson and Narus, 1995). 
Steps of Target Marketing 
As shown below in Figure 7 (Kotler, 1997, p. 249), target marketing involves 
three major steps: market segmentation, market targeting, and market positioning. 
Figure 7- Steps in Marketing Segmentation, Targeting, and Positioning 
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The Youth Market Survev 
/ 
The market researcher first conducts initial market research involving 
exploratory interviews and surveys to gain insight into consumer altitudes, 
motivations, and behavior. The researcher will attempt to collect data on attributes 
and their importance ratings; brand awareness and ratings; attitudes toward the 
producí; product-usage pattems; demographics, geographics, psychographics of 
the respondents; and other environmental factors. 
To gather Information about the youth market for the U.S. Army, many 
market research tools can be employed. The most useful perhaps is the Youth 
Attitude Tracking Study (YATS). The Pentagon, the headquarters of the United ■* 
States Armed Forces and the Department of Defense, has conducted the annual 
Youth Attitude Tracking Survey since 1975. The Youth Attitude Tracking Survey 
consists of a 30-minute phone survey given to 10,000 military aged youths from 16 
to 24-years-old. Teenage Research Unlimited (TRU) also conducts a direct mail 
survey using a representative sample of 2,000 Teenagers from ages 12 to 19- 
years-old. The Army also conducts the New Recruit Survey (NRS), a direct mail 
survey of new recruits entering service involving a sample size of 34,000 Regular 
Army (RA) and 8,600 United States Army Reserve (USAR) soldiers. The University 
of
 Michigan, with a program named "Monitoring the Future," surveys 17,000 high 
school seniors per year in the Spring along with longitudinal surveys of 2,400 
mndornly selected respondents. 
Seqmentation Variables 
Segmentation variables can be divided into broad categories (geographic, 
demographic, psychographic, and behavioral). The major segmentation variables 
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that are most commonly used by market researchers for consumer markets are 
/ 
listed in Table 1 below (Kotler, 1997, p. 257). 
Table 1- Major Segmentation Variables for Consumer Markets 
Geographic Region, City or Metro Size, Density, Climate 
Demographic 
Age, Family Size, Gender, Income, Occupation, Education, 
Religion, Race, Generation, Nationality, Social Class 
Psychographic Lifestyle, Personality 
Behavioral 
Occasions, Benefits, User Status, Usage Rate, Loyalty 
Status, Buyer-Readiness Stage, Attitude Toward Product 
The first major step of implementing a target marketing strategy is market 
^gmentation, as seen previously in Figure 7. This first major step involves three 
stages: the survey stage, the analysis phase, and, finally, the profile stage. 
8.1. Survey Stage 
The purpose of the survey stagé is to gather ali available data pertaining to 
Army^ recruiting market: the U.S. youth population, particularly from the prime 
V 
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market of 17 to 21-year-olds. The information required include surveying the 
/ 
economic, educational, and sociopolitical environments; market size; general 
characteristics and attitudes of the youth population; their propensity to serve in the 
military and the Army in particular; and desired job attributes; 
8.1.1. Economic Environment 
The economic environment is perhaps the primary contributor to the U.S. 
Army's current recruiting crisis. The continuous economic expansion of the United 
States economy throughout the late 1990s has created plentiful employment 
opportunities for America^ youth. Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, calls it "the best economy in 50 years". Unemployment fell to a 30-year 
record low in October 1999—just 4.1 percent according to the U.S. Labor 
Department (Recruiíers, 1999). An unemployment rate this low is what economists 
call "full employment." Figure 8 shows unemployment figures for American youth in 
the Army's prime market of 17 to 21-year-olds from 1978 to 1997. In other words, 
the only Americans unemployed are those not looking for a job or who are 
temporarily between jobs. The job market is extremely competitive and the 
economists forecast continued economic strength through the year 2002. 
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Figure 8- Youth Unemployment: 1978 to 1997 
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Continued good economic news will make the Recruiting Command's job 
even more difficult. Low unemployment and continued growth in jobs forces 
companies to try harder to find workers, including offering better pay and bonuses. 
^his means high school graduates who are not going to college—the key market for 
^rmy recruiters—have more choices other than joining the Army. 
8.1.2. Educational Environment 
More high school graduates are choosing to immediately pursue 
Uridergraduate-level education in the nation's universities and community colleges. 
As shown in Figure 9, over a period of 23 years, the percentage of high school 
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graduates attending college during the year following graduation has risen from 
/ 
around 48 percent to over 67 percent (Young, 1999). 
Figure 9- College Continuation Rates for Recent High School Graduates 1974-1997 
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In other words, in addition to competing with civilian employers and the other 
niilitary services in the job market, the Army must also compete with America^ 
colleges and universities for America^ high school graduates. Increased college 
funding opportunities have greatly contributed to the increased number of 
Qraduates attending college. Additionally, today's youth understand that in today's 
Job market it is essential to have a degree in order to succeed. Of the youth 
surveyed, around 33 percent want to go to college but lack the financial means to 
attend college. Another 33 percent want to attend college and have the financial 
^eans available to attend. The remainder do not want to go to college. 
Although college enrollments are increasing, the dropout rate is high with 
only 50% receiving an undergraduate degree. Many analysts predict this dropout 
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rate to increase about one percent annually during the coming years (Young, 1999), 
/ 
Therefore, although there are more high school graduates enrolling in college 
today, fewer and fewer are actually completing the programs and graduating. These 
students dropping out of college before graduation represent a potentially high- 
payoff segment for the Army. These students generally are highly-qualified and also 
tend to be looking for employment and are trying to repay college loans. The Army's 
college loan repayment option would probably be very attractive to someone in this 
group. 
8.1.3. Sociopolitical Environment 
As President Clinton continues to use the United States Armed Forces to 
shape the new international environment and influence the post-Cold War world, 
support in the United States for a stronger military is on the rise. Also, the public's 
confidence in its institutions is rebounding. On the negative side, veteran 
representation within the natio^s public institutions is declining and is expected to 
continue to decline into the near future. 
8.1.4. Size of the Market 
The primary market for the Army has grown steadily over the last four years 
and Woods and Poole expect the increase to continue in the coming years. As 
shown in Figure 10, the 17 to 21-year-old population was 17.5 million in 1995 and is 
Projected to grow to around 20.5 million in 2003 (Zsido, 1999). 
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Figure 10- Total U.S. Population of 17 to 21-Year-Old8 
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In addition to an increase in raw numbers of youth in the Army's youth 
^arket, there is ever increasing ethnic diversity within the population itself. As seen 
'h Figure 11, ethnic minorities now make up one-third of the youth population and 
Nie percentage of minorities is expected to rise dramatically in the coming years 
(Voung, 1999). 
Some minoríty groups are under-represented in the Army when compared to 
their representation in American society as a whole. 
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Figure 11 - 1999 Ethnlcity of U.S. Population among 17 to 21-year-Olds 
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8.1.5. Prime Market 
Over 80 percent of the Army^ recruits each year come directly from 17 to 21 
year-old males. In 1999, the number of 17 to 21-year-old males in the U.S. 
Population is projected to reach 9.9 million, growing to 11.4 million by 2010. 
However, of the total market of 17 to 21-year-old males, the Army considers only 
around 14 percent of them as the prime market—fu\\y qualified, desirable young 
^en who are not currently in the military, college, or incarcerated (Figure 12). The 
"•QOO prime market of males is projected to number 1.4 million, growing to around 
1
-65 million by 2010 (Zsido, 1999). This prime market, or only 14 percent of ali 17 to 
21-year-old males in the U.S. population, provides 38 percent of the Non-Prior 
Service (NPS) total. Forty-one percent of the 17 to 21-year-olds are not high school 
Qraduate degree holders (HSDG) or failed to score in the top three test score 
categories on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) 
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standardized entrance exam, but make up 20 percent of the non-prior service 
/ 
(NPS) recruits. 
Figure 12- U.S. Youth Population of 17 to 21-Year-Olds by Segment 
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8.1.6. The Generations and Youth Attitudes 
The prime market for the Army consists primarily of members from the 
Qeneration described as the "Net Generation," while still attracting a small number 
of
 recruits from "Generation Xers" (Figure 13). Today's recruiting-age youth from 
Generation X and especially the Net Generation have unique attitudes, important 
bernes, and desires as consumers. 
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Figure 13- The Generations of the U.S.—1910 to 2000 
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America's youth of the late 1990s create winning situations for themselves. 
Although they are willing to work hard and create a winning situation for themselves 
and desire financial success, they also value a balance between work and leisure. 
^hey are unwilling to compromise fun and contentment. They view work, jobs, and 
education as tools to create the fulfilling life they desire (Youth Attitude Tracking 
Survey, 1997). 
Differing from past generations, the X and Net Generations readily accept 
^iversity, notwithstanding race, gender, or lifestyle. These youth are savvy— 
accustomed to the proliferation of advertising, entertainment, and news media and 
^istribution channels. They are not easily swayed in their views and they value their 
independence. Important themes of the Net Generation include strong 
lndependence and a sense of autonomy. They value free expression and have 
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strong views. Members of the Net Generation recognize the value of innovation, 
/ 
trust, and investigation. They possess a certain immediacy in their desires—once 
they decide they want something, they want it immediately. As consumers, the Net 
Generation youth want options, customized products, the right to change their mind, 
and like to try out a product before they purchase it (Youth Attitude Tracking 
Survey, 1997). 
Additionally, the Net Generation, also known as the Y Generation, are not 
'nteracting socially with other people as much as previous generations, creating a 
generation of withdrawn, shy, less confident young people. A study recently 
conducted by the Fortino Group, a consulting firm in Pittsburgh, claims that children 
* 
ages 10 to 17 (known as the Genation Y-ers or Net Generation) will spend nearly 
one third of their lives—or 23 years and two months, on average—on the Internet 
(Hammond, 1999). The Fortino Group conducted the study over nine months and 
the study involved 6,000 people of ali ages and with varying leveis of Internet 
Practical understanding. Based on the results of the study, the Fortino Group 
Predicts some possible trends: those in this age group may experience 31 percent 
fewer face-to-face interactions than the Generation X-ers before them. 
8.1.7. Propensity to Serve 
Unfortunately, for the U.S. Armed Services, the number of American youth 
considering military service has decreased since a decade-long peak in 1991 
tollowing Operation Desert Storm during the Persian Gulf War with Iraq. Of the four 
Military services, the Army holds the second-highest percentage of youth displaying 
'Werest in military service, displaying positive propensity to serve. As shown in 
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Figure 14, the propensity to serve in ali services has declined since 1991, but ali 
/ 
have been steady since 1994 (Youth Attitude Tracking Survey, 1997). 
Figure 14- Propensity of 16 to 24-Year-Old Males 
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Even more disturbing than the decreased propensity to serve is the more 
Nian 10 percent increase in the number of youths who stated that they would 
"definitely not" serve in the armed forces with 55 percent stating they would 
"definitely not serve in the Army" (Youth Attitude Tracking Survey, 1997). 
As shown in Figure 15, when these same youths were surveyed concerning 
their propensity to serve in the Army specifically, as opposed the Navy, Air Force, 
0r
 Marines, whites, Flispanics, and African-Americans demonstrated very different 
Propensity patterns. White youth's propensity to serve in the Army peaks at age 16 
while they are still attending high school with no recovery in their propensity to 
sorve following the continuous decrease after age 16. Minorities, however, 
e)<perience a peak in propensity around age 17 with a late propensity surge around 
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age 22. Female propensity followed the same general pattems as males (Youth 
/ 
Altitude Tracking Survey, 1997). 
Figure 15- Army Propensity by Ethnicity 
Late 
Propensity 
16 
Surge 
Hispamcs 
a) 30 
CL 
frican Amenc >> 
20 
White 
10 Q, 
17 18 19 20 21 
Males By Age 
22 23 24 
8.1.8. Desired Job Attributes: What They Want 
When asked in the Pentagon's annual Youth Attitude Tracking Survey to list 
the job attributes most important and those least important to. them, less than 50 
Percent listed the opportunities for travei and adventure among the most important. 
However, these are exactly the attributes that the Army tends to emphasize most 
and promote aggressively in its marketing efforts. 
Of the most important attributes any job, military or civilian, should offer, over 
80 percent of the youth listed, in order of most importance to less important, the 
fcfllowing items; 
1. Job with Good Pay 
2. Job Security / Steady Job 
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3. Personal Freedom 
/ 
4. Environment Free from Sexual Harassment 
5. Job to Be Proud Of 
6. Job That Prepares Them for a Future Career 
7. Job Where They Learn a Trade or Skill 
8. Non-routine Work 
Although the 
the Arm 
8.1.9. Attractive Aspects of Military Service 
When asked what attributes of military service interested them, American 
Vouth responded wiíh 
1. Pay for education 
2. Job training 
3. Pay 
4. Sense of duty or obligation to the nation. 
^he least interesting aspects of serving in the military listed were family tradition, 
national defense, a last-resort employer, and the opportunity to get away from 
Qangs. 
8.1.10. Job Attributes: Civilian versus Military 
Throughout the 1990s, Amenca's youth increasingly view a civilian job as 
Providing a greater number of satisfying attributes than a military job. Given certain 
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attributes, the surveyed youth are asked to choose which job—military or civilian— 
/ 
they think would be more likely to satisfy a particular attribute. Attributes include 
descriptions such as "work as part of a team," "opportunity for adventure," or 
"provide skill training in preparation for a future job." From 1992 to 1998, the 
following attributes have risen dramatically—over 10 points—for civilian jobs: 
íf Doing Something For Your Country 
ff Working in a High-Technology Environment 
ff Role in Decision Making 
ff Preparation for a Future Job 
ff Work as Part of a Team 
•% 
ff Opportunity for Adventure 
In surprising downward shift, the following attributes have decreased more 
than 10 points for a military job; 
U Do Something for Your Country 
11 Work as Part of a Team 
li Develop Self-Discipline 
The fact that these three attributes have greatly decreased for the military job 
says something about the image of military service among today^ youth. 
Historically speaking, these three attributes—service to country, teamwork, and 
self-discipline—served in great part as the very definition of military service. It 
aPpears that the image of military service is undergoing drastic transformation in 
the public mind. 
As shown in Figure 16, since 1997, American youth surveyed by the 
Department of Defense have indicated that a civilian job would be more likely to 
have the job attributes important to them than would a military job. This trend 
64 
'ndicates a steady erosion or shift from a military job toward a civilian job throughout 
the 1990s (Youth Attitude Tracking Survey, 1997). 
Figure 16 - Job Attributes-—Military versus Civilian 
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The Army obviously offers unique job attributes that most civilian companies 
cannot equal. However, the Army has failed to effectively communicate those 
Onique attributes to the public. The public does not currently value the attributes 
^at the Army offers, instead looking to civilian employers to fulfill their desires for 
these characteristics. 
8.1.11. Barriers to Service 
According to the most recent Youth Attitude Tracking Survey, the biggest 
harriers preventing them from considering military service as an employment option 
Were: 
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1. Military Lifestyle 
/ 
2. Other Career Interests 
3. Long Commitment Involved 
4. Threat to Life 
Among the smallest barriers listed were low pay, negative publicity, and not being 
fully qualified for service. 
8.1.12. Impressions of the Military in America 
When young Americans were asked where they got their impressions about 
We in the military. the top four responses were 1) movies and television, 2) friends 
their age, 3) older friends, and 4) a family member. Veterans play a large role in 
torming the image of the military in a young perso^s mind. However, as the number 
of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam veterans continues to dwindle in the coming 
Vears, this influence will continue to decrease in American society. Contributing to 
the problem is a low endorsement rate of military service from those soldiers 
serving on active duty in the Army. When active duty Army soldiers were asked 
"Would you personally recommend the Army to a male youth?", only 48 percent 
replied "yes". This percentage was even lower—only 33 percent—when asked if 
they would recommend the Army to a young female (Sample Survey of Military 
personnel, 1999). 
8.2. Analysis Phase 
After gathering data from various market research tools. the data must be 
onalyzed using factor analysis to remove highly correlated variables. During the 
ooalysis, the market was divided into six basic major segments, as shown on the 
next several pages in Figures 17 through 22. 
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1. High School Graduates 
/ 
2. College Students 
3. High School Seniors 
4. Females 
5. Hispanics 
6. African-Americans 
Although it is usoful to discuss th© markst in tsrms of thGs© six major groups, 
thGSG six groupings fail to takc into account ali potcntial sogmcnts. IhcsG six 
groups are not mutually gxcIusívg and subgroups can bc creatGd bGtwGGn thom. 
Por GxamplG, obviously thcre are fcmalcs (major scgmcnt 6) who are Hispanic 
(major scgmcnt 5) in thcir scnior ycar of high school (major sagmant 3). This group 
constitutGs an cntirely ncw scgmcnt with its own uniqu© charactGristics. Thasc 
uniquG scgmants can be bcttcr idantifiGd through housahold classification or 
'"festyl© scgmcntation. The naxt scction discussos tha 50 segments that were 
'dentified using cluster analysis of U.S. households. 
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Figure 17 - The High School Graduate Segment 
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Figure 18 - The College Segment 
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Figure 19 - The Sénior Segment 
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Figure 20 - The Female Segment 
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Figure 21 - The Hispanic Segment 
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Figure 22 - The African-American Segment 
0 
O 
c 
CO 
E 
v_ 
0 
CL 
"cõ 
o ■ ■■■■■ 
o 
H—» 
(í) ■ ■■■Ml 
x 
tt- «9 
Si. 
_ w « 
?|| I- o o 
® CJ) tf) C 3 
■o ® S £ 95? m cn 
eo o í? 9- 95 t .E /= o ® .9->- =j m C3 < Q. T3 li. o c 
(0 
c 
o 
« ta 
<u 
o 
o 
< 
0) 
-4^ (0 3 T3 CO Um 
O 
«rSSAd 
Z6ÀJ 
fJSAJ 
K AJ 
- W AJ 
D 
>- 
O <n 
§§§§§§§§ 
8 8' fi 8' S S 8 8 S 
psssaDav JsqumN 
es aj 
Asl 
S Ad 
J06AJ 
0 
0 
D 
■o 
0 
v_ 
CD 
co 
X 
0 
co 
0 
>> 
T- 
CM 
0 
E 
D) 
0 
CO 
aT 
T- 
8 ■a a. 
0 T3 
cr (0 
0 (0 "D 
3 
1 O" 
d <D O O 
—— 3 r> 
E 
w 
w 
O) tf) 
00 TO 
• O 
0 
•*-> 
0 i_ 
SI 
% 
O V— 
O) 
vo 
CM 
cní 
c 
g 
o 
13 
"D 
2 
Q. 
CO 
0. 
z 
< 
a: 
a> 
m 
V) 
I— 
0 
O 2 _ 
Cg 2 I 
00- c? ^ 
£/) 
c tf) 
0 "D 
r- © 
0 c 
o. SL 
o O 
u_ 
CL 
D. 
2 
o 
E 
c 
© 
CO h- 
© o k_ 3 O CO 
0 
D) 
D 
O 
f— 
"O 
c 
0 
0 
-f-» 
c 
1 
<0 
c 
o <D (D © CD 
(0 (0 
D) 
O) Q. C © 
<D 
v. 
o 8 
O 
« 
© 
.C 
F 
k_ 
o Q O H- Q. 
s 
© 
>4 (0 •*-* 
>% (D 
C 
O 
O 
<D 
> 
<D 
1 • 
Q 
• 
a 
• 
a: 
< 
0 
3 
■D 
© 
W 
c 
© 
a. 
o i— 
a. 
2 
o 
E 
c 
© 
£ 
o 
© 
*♦- 
0 
-ê~» 
CO 
1 
o 
O) i5 
o © 
£ E 
© O) 
>, © 
-tT to 
© 
c 
© 
Ql 
O 
© 
c 
© o 
-íl4 © 
w 
£ 
çp 
S 
c 
© 
-J O É 
© >» Ê © SJ 
"f E 
t © o © > u_ o 
m 0 • • 
3 
® _ 
W (0 
«> -9 g 
+-> 
3 
JQ 
Í2 E 
||| jn  © 
O) i_ 
0) 
ro 
© 
O 
5 | S c £ S 
< •(OU. 
<D CO 
® 
8 ? 
? O ^ | - s 
^ <D r- 
C C = >, 
^ 5 © 0. 
73 
In addition to segmenting by individuais, it is possible to segment the U.S. 
/ 
population according to household type or lifestyles. Lifestye segmentation can 
more effectively describe the segments, By including not only segmentation 
variables such as age, sex, ethnic background, education, geographic location, but 
also household characteristics such as media habits, income levei, purchasing 
patterns. family size, hobbies and interests, and previous military service, among 
others, a more complete description of the segment is achieved. 
Next. the six major groups, or segments, were subdivided further into minor 
groups, or clusters. By identifying distinguishing characteristics of each segment, a 
segment profile can then be created. 
■* 
8.3. Profillng Stage 
According to Philip Kotler (1997). each cluster should be profiled based on 
distinguishing attitudes, behavior, demographics, psychographics, and media 
^bits. Each segment can then be given a name based on a dominant 
distinguishing characteristic (1997). The U.S. households in this project were 
clustered and segmented based upon the following weighted variables; 
o Affluence 
o Age 
o Housing Type 
o Household Relations / Family Size 
o Race 
o Occupation 
o Education Levei 
o AH other variables 
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The criticai assumption here is that similar households will behave the same 
/ 
in terms of buying motives and attitudes (propensity toward military service) 
regardless of geographical location. However, as discussed later, this does not 
mean that each geographic area will have the same high-payoff segments, Later, 
further analysis of the segments by geographic location will reveal unique patterns 
within each recruiting brigade^ geographical area. In other words, each recruiting 
brigade may have more or less success with certain segments when compared to 
another recruiting brigade. However, at this point, differences in geographic location 
are ignored. 
Using cluster analysis, 50 different segments were identified. Next, the 50 
clusters were studied to identify distinguishing characteristics, traits, and attributes 
within each segment. 
' Annex 3 contams bnef descnptions of theArmy s 50 custom household segments 
^
;
 __[ w. ___ ___ "..._  . - ^ v , ^ ^ 
L MARKET TARGETING 
After having identified the various distinct segments within the market, one 
aiust then identify which segments will be targeted. In other words, which of the 
identified segments offer superior potential. Some segments may display above- 
average potential and are segments where the firm can outperform the competition 
by meeting the needs of the segments better than competitors. In this analysis, 
segments were compared to historical Army recruiting data to determine which 
segments have, in recent years, been above-average producers for the Army. 
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The purpose of the next step, data analysis, is to identify in which of the 50 
/ 
segments has the Army outperformed the competition and from which segments 
has the Army received a greaíer proportion of its recruits. 
9.1. Data Analysis: Army Contracts by Custom Segment 
In July and August of 1999, while working with the Demographic Analysis 
Celi of the Program Analysis and Evaluation Division of the U.S. Army Recruiting 
Command. 310,344 records from previously contracted recruits recruits from the 
Period August 1995 to July 1999—a period of 48 months—were classified into one 
of the 50 custom segments previously described. The operation successfully placed 
over 90 percent of recruits' records (279,472) into one of the 50 segments that most 
appropriately and most accurately described the recruit. 
Next, two percentages were calculated. The first percentage represented the 
number of previously contracted files that carne from each segment. The second 
Percentage represented the proportion of the total number of U.S. households 
(99,956,289) represented by each segment. 
The next step involved comparing the percentage of recruits contracted from 
9 particular segment with the percentage of total U.S. households that the segment 
represented to obtain an índex. An index of 100% indicates that the proportion of 
Army recruits contracted from a segment exactly match that segments proportion of 
households in the United States. For example, looking at Table 2 on the following 
Page, segment number 24 represents a potential target segment. The reasoning 
behind this is that the Army has previously recruited 4.4% of its soldiers from this 
segment. However, this particular segment only represents 2.2% of U.S. 
households. The corresponding index of 197.8 signifies that the Army recruited 
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nearly double the percentage of its recruits from this segment compared to the 
segmenfs proportion of U.S. households. 
Sample Calculation of Index 
☆ Step 1 
Number of Contracts from Segment 24 = 
Total number of Contracts for Period = 
* Step 2 
Number of Households in Segment 24 = 
Total Number of U.S. Households = 
^ Step 3 
Proportion of Contracts from Segment 24 / Total Number of Contracts 
Proportion of Households in Segment 24 / Total Number of Households 
eguals an index of =0.043586/0.022031 = 1.97842 = 197.8% 
12.181 + 
279.472 
0.043586 or 4.4% 
2,202,095 -s- 
99,956,289 
0.022031 or 2.2% 
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Table 2- Army Contracts^by Custom Segment 
Segment Contracts Army % U.S. HHs U.S. % Index 
1 718 0.3% 1,115,158 1.1% 23 
2 2,331 0.8% 1,144,081 1.1% 72.9 
3 2,900 1.0% 1,915,423 1.9% 54.2 
4 3,270 1.2% 2,760,399 2.8% 42.4 
5 6,360 2.3% 2,321,268 2.3% 98 
6 4,161 1.5% 1,800,197 1,8% 82.7 
7 563 0.2% 675,324 0.7% 29.8 
8 3,017 1.1% 2.719,286 2.7% 39.7 
9 111 0.0% 72,905 0.1% 54.5 
10 11,994 4.3% 5,760,443 5.8% 74.5 
11 12,982 4.6% 3,362,314 3.4% 138.1 
12 3,576 1.3% 3,170,887 3.2% 40,3 
13 176 0.1% 621,781 0.6% 10.1 
14 254 0.1% 367,537 0.4% 24.7 
15 9,078 3.2% 4,326,929 4.3% 75 
16 19,773 7.1% 6,023.187 6.0% 117.4 
17 11,034 3.9% 2,431,197 2.4% 162.3 
18 16,226 5.8% 4,649,071 4.7%' 124.8 
19 179 0.1% 84,019 0.1% 76.2 
20 2,027 0.7% 1.733.465 1.7% 41.8 
21 210 0.1% 370,284 0.4% 20.3 
22 4,377 1.6% 2,312,153 2.3% 67.7 
23 11,256 4.0% 5,026,452 5.0% 80.1 
24 12,181 4.4% 2,202.095 2.2% 197.8 
25 10,963 3.9% 3,182,202 3.2% 123.2 
26 410 0.1% 166,801 0.2% 87.9 
27 863 0.3% 323.708 0.3% 95.4 
28 5,761 2.1% 1,598,569 1.6% 128.9 
29 1,657 0.6% 486,564 0.5% 121.8 
30 1,060 0.4% 1,225,149 1.2% 30.9 
31 688 0.2% 623,820 0.6% 39.4 
32 4,344 1.6% 2,121,408 2.1% 73.2 
33 608 0,2% 409,048 0.4% 53.2 
34 2,138 0.8% 513,248 0.5% - 149 
35 11,821 4.2% 3,221,777 3.2% 131.2 
36 2,774 1.0% 1,490,987 1.5% 66.5 
37 417 0.1% 557,431 0.6% 26.8 
38 30,286 10,8% 8,546,042 8.5% 126.8 
39 8,731 3.1% 3,729,294 3.7% 83.7 
40 16,937 6.1% 4,617,487 4.6% 131.2 
41 6,672 2.4% 1,774,926 1.8% 134.4 
42 8,062 2.9% 1,462,140 1.5% 197.2 
43 669 0.2% 273,531 0.3% 87.5 
44 450 0,2% 132,645 0.1% 121.3 
45 3,739 1.3% 1,606,525 1.6% 83.2 
46 12,835 4.6% 3,014,943 3.0% 152.3 
47 2,323 0.8% 697,141 0.7% 119.2 
48 1,549 0.6% 1,033,458 1.0% 53.6 
49 303 0.1% 107,420 0.1% 100.9 50 4,658 1.7% 74,170 0,1% 2246.2 
Total Contracts 279,472 100% Total t 99,956,289 100% 
In other words, if ali other things are equal, there should be the same 
/ 
proportion of contracts coming from a segment as the proportion of U.S. 
households that the segment represents. Segmenting the market in this way allows 
the Army to define and understand the differences between the segment and the 
diagonal "line," 
The Une is the "expected' plot of the segments when the proportion of recruit 
contracts coming from a particular segment equais the proportion of U.S. 
households that the particular segment represents 
9.2. Selection of Target Segments 
Referring to Figure 23 on the next page, the segments that plotted above the 
diagonal line, defined above, indicate that the members from this segment have 
displayed. at least in the past four years, a higher propensity or likelihood to enlist in 
Army. Conversely, those segments plotted below the line are not as likely to buy 
0ur product—Army service. 
Segments plotted above the line represent high-payoff segmêntô for the Army. 
By studying these segments above the line, and perhaps on the line, the 
Arrr,y can create profiles of each segment. From these profiles, the Army can 
^elop positioning concepts that would more than likely appeal to members of 
each segment. Therefore, the Army customizes its recruiting efforts more effectively 
arid efficiently. 
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Figure 23 -Army Contracta by Custom Segment 
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As seen on the following page. Figure 24, currently 18 segments comprise ^ *7 
the Army's core segments without consideration to geographic area, producing 
nearly 63 percent of ali contracted recruits. Five segments produce a large 
percentage of the Army's contracts, but are underrepresented when compared to 
the segments' proportion in the U.S. population. The Army could attempt to improve 
its penetration of these five segments (segments 5, 10, 15, 23, and 39) through 
adapted. targeted, and more intensely focused marketing efforts, These 
underrepresented segments seem to present the Army with a good opportunity to 
exploit. 
In the upper left hand corner of Figure 24, five extremely small segments are 
producing more than their proportionate share of recruits for the Army. It seems to 
reason that the Army holds some sort of competitive advantage in these niche 
markets. In these five segments, the Army must determine to what it owes this 
success. The Army must not only ensure that it maintains its advantageous position 
in these segments, but it should attempt to exploit this favorable situation. 
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Figure 24 - Productlon Analysis of Segmente 
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9.3. Target Segments by Geographic Area 
Next, the cluster analysis was repeated, but, this time, consideration was 
given to the performance of the different segments according to their geographic 
location—specifically within each recruiting brigade^ area of responsibility, 
The rnsults demonstrated that the segments representing the com, 
undenepresented, niche, and low-production quadrants diffemd 
gmatly within each recruiting brigade. 
Examples of core segments for the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Recruiting Brigades are 
shown in Figures 25 through 27 on the following pages. The charts clearly 
demonstrate that each recruiting brigade has a unique recruiting environment and 
requires a customized marketing approach. These findings suggest that the Army 
could develop marketing campaigns by recruiting brigade in order to customize its 
message to the custom profiles of the high-payoff targets within that geographic 
area. Today, the Army is advertising at a national levei, undifferentiated by target 
segments within a geographic region. 
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Figure 25 -Productlon Analysis—2nd Rocruiting Brigado (Qeographic Area) 
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• Each of the core segments produces less than 9% each 
• Segment 2 is unigue to 2d Brigade as far as volurne and index. 
• Segment 1 is a core segment in 2d Bde, but is only 0.3% of total 
Army production with an Army index of only 23. 
. Segments 1 and 2 are in the lower left quadrant of total Army 
production chart and are considered "work but donl chase" 
segments. However, segments land 2 are clearly strong 
performers in 2d Brigade, 
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Figure 26 -Production Analysls—3rd Recjuiting Brigado (Geographlc Aroa) 
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• Segment 11 contributes more than 18.5% of total contracts for 3rd 
Brigade compared to 4.6% of total Army production. 
• Segment 13 is unique to 3d Brigade as far as volume and 
production, with an index 10 times greater than segment ^'s total 
Army production index of only 10.1. 
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Figure 27-Productfon Analysis—«tt) Recruttlng Brigada (Goographlc Area) 
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• Segment 8 is unígue to Sth Brigade in that it has an index of over 
150 in Sth Brigade compared to a total Arrny production index of 
only 39.7. 
• Segment 8 is the top producing segment within Sth Brigade with 
over 10% of total contract production in the brigade. 
. Segment 23's index of nearly 114 is unique to Sth Brigade. 
Segment 23 only indexes at 80.1 as far as Army-wide production. 
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Segments 4, 6, 11, and 12 ali have indexes above the expected value of 100 
and form a part of the core segments for ali three brigades: 2d, 3dt and 6th. This 
simple example serves to illustrate the complexity of the market in which the Army 
is recruiting and how much analysis rnust be done in order to determine the unique 
market environment that each brigade operates in. 
Next, let us not only isolate the segments within a particular brigade, but also 
see how the particular 50 segments perform within one specific brigade within the 
six major segments. The Sth Recruiting Brigade will be used to demonstrate how a 
particular brigade can have very unique circumstances within its recruiting 
environment. For example, as shown in Figures 28. 29, and 30, the High School, 
•* 
College, and Afrícan-American core segments display different characteristics than 
the numbered segments do when compared to aggregate total Army production 
Figure 28—Sth Brigade High School Core Segments 
Sth BDE "Seniors" Core Segments 
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Most obvious here in this analysis is the importance of Segment 10 in 5th Brigade, 
producing over 16% of total recruiting production. Also worthy of noting is the fact 
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64.9% Core customers 
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that Segment 13, and especially segmentas, are unique in that they greatly out- 
index the segments" Índices of Army production as a whole. 
Figure 29—Sth Recruiting Brigade College Core Segments 
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What is interesting to note here is that segments 16 and 18 basically index at 
just over 100 in total Army production. However, in Sth Brigade, segments 16 and 
18 index at over 150 and 225 respectively and are excellent performers. In addition, 
segment 21. wiíh an overall index of only 20.3, weighs in Sth Brigade at well over 
120. This is unique to 5th Brigade. 
Perhaps most noteworthy in this particular chart is the fact that ali other top 
Producing segments, as far as total aggregate Army production, are ali under- 
fepresented in Sth Brigade; 
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Figure 30—Sth Brigado Afrjcan-American Core Segmenta 
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The analysis of the African-American segments in Sth Brigade produced 
what were perhaps the most surprising and most noteworthy results. Here, in 5ht 
Brigade, wealthy and affluent urban-dwelling African-Americans in Sth Brigade 
constitute the majority of African-American recruits. In fact, segment 3 produces 
over 21% of ali contracted African-Americans. Segments 1, 2, and 3 ali index below 
100 in total aggregate production, but are extremely strong in the African American 
Tiarket segment. 
It is evident that after conducting this detailed market segmentation and 
segment evaluation, each recruiting brigade should know which segments make up 
'ts core, under-represented, niche, and low-production quadrants. Without this 
knowledge, the only option available is the continued use of the Army^ traditional 
"shotgun" approach to recruiting and marketing. 
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However, armed with detailed knowledge of their target segments, the 
recruiting brigades. together with USAREC, can focus on the appropriate target 
segments. In this way, the brigades maximize their effectiveness and minimize the 
expenditure of precious resources. The Army and its recruiting brigades must not 
simply identify and evaluate the various segments and their respective impact on 
recruiting operations. Army recruiters must continually survey the marketplace and 
conduct market segmentation to identify shifts and changes in the market as they 
occur. 
If the U.S. Army Recruiting Command embraces modern market 
segmentation theory, it will have the tools necessary to effectively and efficiently 
recruit the required numbers of quality soldiers. 
10. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis conducted in this study cleaiiy demonstrates that American 
youth from certain market segments are more likely to enlist in the Army than 
others. Given the higher propensity to serve in certain market segments, it should 
be more effective and more economical for the Army to focus recruiting efforts on 
these high-payoff segments. The Army should minimize its recruiting efforts in 
segments that demonstrate a lower-than-average propensity to serve and have 
historically provided very few recruits to the Army. In summary, the analysis 
Produced the following conclusions; 
1. Recent efforts by the Clinton administration and sénior military officials 
have failed to resolve the Arrny^ current recruiting crisis. 
2. Costs associated with recruiting an individual soldier are increasing. 
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3. Current Army marketing efforts fail to distinguish low-propensity 
segments from high-propensity segments and tend to communicate 
one recruiting message to ali segments nationwide, 
4. It is possible to identify distinct segments representing core, niche, 
under-represented, and low-production segment groups within each 
recruiting brigade's area of responsibility 
5. Each recruiting brigade operates in a unique environment. The Army 
can no longer afford to communicate íhe same recruiting message to ali 
segments throughout ali areas of the country. The Army must target 
segments within each brigade and create profiles of those segments. 
6. By developing custom profiles based upon the target segments, the 
Army should be able to increase the effectiveness of its marketing 
campaigns since the Army will understand the attribuíes, 
characteristics, and media habits of the target segments within each 
recruiting brigade" 
7. By increasing recruiting effectiveness through target marketing, the 
Army should also decrease the recruiting costs per soldier. 
,11. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings in this study, the Army should adopt a selective 
specialization marketing strategy. The Army does not have the universal appeal or 
the immense resources required to attempt to compete in the market as a whole 
Although at least 50 segments have been identified, the Army should not approach 
these segments in the same way nor with an equal amount of effort or expense. 
The Army should recruit in these segments, but, in order to appeal to the different 
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needs, desired attributes, and characteristic^s of different segmenta, it must adapt its 
marketing methods. The Army should create a distinctive brand image that appeals 
to particular segment or group of segments, based on the custom profiles, in order 
to capitalize on the unique aspects of each segment. 
Before addressing recommended marketing strategies for the Army 
recruiting brigades, let us discuss some more general recruiting opportunities that 
apply to ali of the recruiting brigades and the country as a whole. 
11.1. General Recruiting Opportunities 
In addition to adapting and customizing a marketing campaign to support the 
each recruiting brigade^ target segments. there are several additional recruiting 
opportunities for the Army as a whole to exploit. 
• Expand recruiting and advertising efforts to reach more of the fast- 
growing and underrepresented Hispanic population. 
• Expand recruiting into the four-year, two-year, and technical colleges 
in order to exploit attractiveness of the Army^ college loan repayment 
programs and simultaneously increase access to tpp-quality youth. 
• Include atírition as a factor in measuring and rewarding Army recruiter 
performance. In other words, instead of linking recruiter success and 
rewards to the number of recruits who are enlisted or who report to 
basic training, link recruiter success and awards to the number of 
recruits who graduate from basic training and become productive 
service members. In other words, recruiters would have more 
incentive to enlist high-quálity recruits instead of more numbers that 
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do not necessarily produce soldiers who are more productive in the 
long-term. 
• Increase the number of general education development (GED) 
holders recruits by developing and using careful and thorough 
screening criteria. Not ali non-high school diploma holders should be 
rejected; some may be potential high-quality soldiers if given the 
opportunity to excel. 
11.2. Specific Strategles for the Four Quadrants 
The Army should reguire each brigade to conduct a production analysís 
■% 
within in its own geographic area to identify its unique core, underrepresented, 
niche, and low-production segments. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command could 
then assist each recruiting brigade by developing marketing campaigns that are 
adapted to targeted segments within 6dch rocruiting brigQd&'s area of rosponsibility, 
with the marketing campaigns supporting the following strategies; 
o Core Segments; STRONG DEFENSE 
o Underrepresented Segments: ATTACK 
o Niche Segments; EXPLOITATION 
o Low-producing Segments; HOLD 
In other words, each recruiting brigade in the Army must defend and 
maintain its particular core segments (upper right quadrant of the production 
analysis for the brigade). These core segments demonstrate a higher-than-average 
Propensity to serve and have provide a large proportion of contract production for 
the Army. These segments form the solid foundation for the Army's recruiting 
afforts. 
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In the under-represented segments jlower right quadrant), the Army should 
attack to increase representation. These segments are producing, but produce 
fewer recruits per household when compared to the population as a whole. The 
Army must go on the offensive and attack these segments with an aggressive, 
customized marketing campaign, The Army must take "customers" away from its 
competitors, the other military and civilian employers, in these segments. As under- 
represented segments, it seems reasonable that recruiting and marketing 
campaigns can be improved in these areas in order to attract the segment 
members more effectively. 
Within the niche segments (upper left quadrant), the Army must gain a firm 
understanding of its competitive advantage within these segments and remain 
vigilant in protecting this advantage against other competitors. In the low-production 
segments, the Army must not waste precious resources. The Army may continue to 
contract new recruits from these segments. but it must not waste scarce and finite 
resources by specifically targeting these segments. Excess or extraordinary 
recruiting efforts directed toward these segments will be unlikely to produce a 
sufficient return on investment, 
Since there are distinct, identifiable segments in the U.S. youth market that 
display propensities towards military service, it reasons that the Army should focus 
its resources on the high-propensity segments. If those segments already exhibit an 
above-average propensity towards military service, it should be easier, and 
cheaper, for the Army to attract them to enlist in the Army. 
By knowing which segments tend to produce the majority of its enlistment 
contracts, the Army can build profiles of these segments and focus its advertising 
(television, radio, print media). Through the custom profiles, Army marketers should 
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understand the media habits of segment members: what they watch on television. 
what type of radio stations they listen to. what type of print media they read. and so 
on. Improved marketing in the underrepresented segments could produce 
significant increases in recruiting numbers. 
12. CLOSING COMMENTS 
The quality of today^ Army speaks for itself. In the last decade of the 20th 
century. the all-volunteer U.S. Army defeated the Soviet Union and the Warsaw 
Pact without firing a shot and destroyed the fifth largest army in the world in 100 
hours of ground combaí. A draftee Army did not do these things; a well-paid. well- 
led Army of volunteers did. 
The Army must attract and retain the highest quality people. As an all- 
volunteer force, the Army must be competitive in its recruiting operations in the U.S. 
labor market. As recognized by military and politicai leaders today, the success of 
the all-volunteer force is necessarily precarious, dependent on a populace willing 
and able to serve. Therefore, the Army's ability to remain an all-volunteer force 
obviously depends on its ability to continue to attract sufficient numbers of 
volunteers at a reasonable cost. 
America^ youth, as well as those adults who influence their decision- 
making, must view the U.S. Army as a professionally rewarding and personally 
enriching environment within which people take pride in being part of one of the 
Nation's most highly esteemed institutions. 
The Army should implement modem market segmentation techniques to 
identify, select, and target segments. Target marketing will not only increase the 
Army's recruiting effectiveness, but should also reduce its costs per recruit 
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contracted. With target marketing, the Arm^ can focus its resources on high-payoff 
target segments with higher propensities to serve and obtain more recruits for the 
resources expended. 
Immediate action is required to reverse the disturbing recruiting trends of the 
last few years. A highly trained Professional Army is expensive to recruit and even 
more expensive to maintain, but it remains the best guarantor of continued peace 
and prosperity for America and the rest of the world (Danckert 1999), The cost of 
not maintaining America's high-quality, all-volunteer Army would be much greater. 
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14. ANNEX 1: HOW THE ARMY RECRUITS 
14.1. The United States Army Recruiting Command 
The United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), headquartered at 
Fort Knox, Kentucky, is the product of 25 years of refining tools, techniques, and 
business practices. The Recruiting Command traces its beginnings to the 1970 
Gates Commission, which charted a course for maintaining military strength without 
conscription (Welker, 1998). The difficulties faced by USAREC in the late 1970s 
and the steps taken to overcome them serve as lessons for a future in which 
USAREC must preserve the means to succeed despite conditions of undoubtedly 
greater austerity for the Army. 
The mission of USAREC is to "recruit with integrity high-quality men and 
women to meet the accession requirements of America's Arrriy." It consists of five 
brigades, which encompass the continental United States. There are also 
recruiters outside the continental United States (OCONUS) covering AJaska, 
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Germany, Japan, South Korea and Guam. The Recruiting 
Command operates 1,594 recruiting stations and employs over 12,000 soldiers and 
nearly 1,100 civilian employees, as shown in Figure 26 below {USAREC 
Homepage, 1999). 
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Figure 31- U.S. Army Recrultlng Command 
/ 
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In many ways, all-volunteer recruiting has kept the Army from growing 
insular and separate from oíher institutions of American society. Army recruiters live 
and work in ali the communities of the nation. In order to do their job, they must 
gain community support by making a case for Army service with educators, 
business people, and community leaders. They must also leam to deal with the 
media. Through this activity, the American public is better informed about the Army 
and, additionally, soldiers returning to their principal military specialties after a tour 
in the Recruiting Command cannot fail to have a better understanding of the troops 
they will lead and the role of the Army in American society. 
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14.2. Army Recruiters 
/ 
Recruiters are Army personnel selected to work at recruiting stations around 
the country and are the ones who actually communicate with prospective recruits 
and do the initial screening of applicants. If the applicant is eligible and makes the 
decision to enlist. the recruiter processes the enlistment contract—the paperwork 
that officialiy inducts a person into the Army. 
Today there are more than 7,000 active Army and Army Reserve recruiters 
and they live in virtually every community in the nation, working from nearly 1,600 
recruiting stations (Welker, 1998). In many areas. where no military installation is 
nearby. Army recruiters are the Army in their towns. In high schools. colleges. and 
communities across the United States. Army recruiters offer opportunities and 
options no other employer can match for many of today's youth. 
Recruiters are responsible for selling the benefits of Army service to various 
audiences, including potential recruits. their parents, and teachers. Recruiters 
prescreen applicants for military service using established criteria. Those applicants 
who pass the initial screening are sent to one of 65 military entrance processing 
stations (MERS) located throughout the United States. At thesè MERS, applicants 
take a battery of tests and receive a thorough medicai examination. Applicants who 
are selected for service sign an enlistment contract and enter the Delayed Entry 
Program (DER), in an unpaid status, for up to one year. Recruits have time while in 
this program to prepare mentally and physically for basic training. Recruiters are 
responsible for managing the DER by providing recruits with information and 
instrucíion that will help them to transition from civilian to military life (Military 
Recruitment, 1999). 
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Before leaving for basic training, recruits return to the MEPS for final 
/ 
processing. After basic training, most recruits attend specialized technical training 
based on their specific military occupational specialty (MOS) that may last 
anywhere from a few weeks to more than one year before reporting to their first 
duty assignment. Most initial enlistments last 4 years, including the time spent in 
training. 
14.3. Advertising 
Army advertising creates opportunities for recruiters and reinforces their 
success. Advertising makes recruiting easier and helps make the recruiters' 
missions achievable. Advertising creates awareness of Army opportunities and 
generates for the recruiting force its initial contacts with America^ youth. 
The Army will spend $100 million during fiscal year 2000 on television ads- 
its highest budget ever and much more than any other armed service (Omicinski 
1999). In the United States, more than 98 out of 100 households have a television 
set and therefore offers the Army a distribution channel to penetrate neaiiy ali 
households (World in Figures, 1999). Army advertising is often spectacularly good. 
Thirty-second bursts of excitement on their television screens entertain people who 
enjoy watching soldiers in action. These commercial ads evoke emotional 
responses, excite, and inspire viewers. Advertising industry associations single out 
Army advertisements for creative excellence and industry trade journals have called 
the Army's uBe Ali You Can Be" campaign one of the nation's best (Army 
Advertising, 1999). 
Because of Army advertising. potential recruits are already somewhat aware 
of Army opportunities and benefits before speaking with a recruiter. The 
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advertisements tell thousands of potential enlistment prospecta that a recruiter can't 
/ 
personally reach how they can pursue their interest in the Army by calling 1-800- 
USA-ARMY or mailing a postage pre-paid Business Reply Card or by inquiring 
through the U.S. Army Recruiting Homepage on the Internet at www.ooarmv mil. 
The Internet is a new distríbutíon channel to reach even more of América s 
youth. Today^ information age youth are extremely computer literate and spend a 
lot of time on the Internet. In fact, half of United States households now have at 
least one computer—the highest percentage in the world today (World in Figures, 
1999). Most new recruits report seeing or hearing Army advertisements before 
contacting or being contacted by a recruiter (Army Advertising, 1999). 
Army advertising is the first voice a prospective enlistee hears on the subject 
of Army opportunities, often well before he or she reaches enlistment age. It is a 
voice which creates interest that recruiters will have to satisfy and raises questions 
for recruiters to address. 
Army advertising addresses directly the problem that makes recruiting 
difficult; few well-qualified young people can visualize themselves in uniform except 
in a national security emergency. These young people are not anti-military—Gallup 
polis tell us that the Army is well respected by the public —they just have other 
plans. In fact, as Figure 27 below shows, the latest Harris Poli shows that the 
military, once again, topped the list of American institutions commanding public 
confidence (VIP Recruiting Brief, 1999). 
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Figure 32- Amerlcans Confidenco In Institutions 
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Although the quality and dadication of tha men and wornan in uniform 
command such respect from ali Americans, a majority of young Annericans do not 
consider themselves to be "in the market" for the Army's "product"—military service. 
If a person is not in the market for the product that a store is selling, then 
they are unlikely to enter the store. Army advertising gives American youth a reason 
to enter the Army's "store"—the recruiting station. By advertising the many benefits 
of Army service, such as the Montgomery Gl Bill, the Army College Fund, 
enlistment bonuses, valuable training, and leadership experience, the Army^ 
advertising gives a young person a reason to come into the recruiting station and 
learn more about the Army and what it offers. 
More important, advertising first involves potential recruits at a very personal 
levei with the idea of being soldiers. Television commercials show soldiers doing 
things that young civilians can picture themselves doing. Full-color pictures in 
magazine ads do the same for those who watch less television. Radio commercials 
pamt sound pictures. In addition, a great slogan, set to a tune that is hard to get out 
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of one^ head, tells the young person that Army service can help them meet their 
/ 
highest aspirations—help one "Be Ali You Can Be." 
Army advertising creates a picture of Army service that people in the 
business world would call a "brand image." It is not the only possible picture of the 
Army, but is one that bright young Americans can put themselves in easily, 
Simplicity and consistency are most important because an 18-year-old sees and 
hears less than one hour's worth of Army advertising in one year (Army Advertising, 
1999). 
Television advertising tends to be the most effective media for Army 
advertising due to its impact and ability to "display the product." Radio commercials 
are used for high frequency exposure of the Army message at a reasonable cost. 
Magazine advertising is used to reach high qualíty young adults who do not spend 
as much time watching television. 
Only recruiters put people in the Army. However, advertising presells the 
Army for recruiters. 
14.4. Publicity and Promotions 
The Army s marketing Communications involve more than just advertising 
Recruiters benefit from favorable media attention paid to the Army, even if no 
specific recruiting message is communicated. This type of media attention comes 
under the heading of publicity. Positive Army publicity can come from submitting 
news releases to the local newspaper when someone enlists. 
Positive visibility for the Army can also come from promotional activities, 
such as participation with a community event or local sports team. Promotional 
programs help recruiters promote the Army without delivering a direct recruiting 
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sales message. These programs are designed to show recruiters and the Army as 
/ 
caring and responsible members of the local community, 
14.5. Direct Maíl 
Although television advertising is very important to the Arrny^ marketing 
campaign, about 65 percent of ali advertising leads or contacts come from the 
Army's large direct mail program. Each year, the Army mails over 12 million direct 
mail solicitations to students, graduates, and young professionals (Army 
Advertising, 1999). The main objective is to have recipients complete and return the 
Business Reply Card contained in each packet. 
14.6. Premiums 
To encourage recipients to complete and return the reply card provided with 
the direct mail literature, the Army awards premiums to those who respond, The 
premiums awarded are usually pens, coffee mugs, cup coasters, pencils, 
calendars, and even athletic socks that have the Department of the Army seal or 
the slogan "Be Ali You Can Be." These premiums have proven to be extremely 
effective and have historically increased the response rate by over five times than 
the response rate of direct mailings without a premium offer. Of the number of direct 
mail recipients that respond, only five percent result in an enlistment contract. 
Although the conversion rates to an enlistment contract remain the same, with the 
use of premiums, the Army can increase the number of respondents and therefore 
increase the number of contracts (Army Advertising, 1999). Converting five percent 
of 50,000 responses naturally equates to more contracts than five percent of only 
10,000 responses. 
110 
14.7. Costs of Recruiting, Tralníng, and Attrltion 
The Arrrys investment in its enlisted personnel consists of both fixed and 
variable costs. The fixed costs can be thought of as overhead or infrastructure costs 
that are not easily or quickly changed and cannot be directly associated with a 
single enlistee. Examples of these costs are the total number of recruiters or drill 
instructors or the money spent by the Army on a television advertisement campaign 
for recruiting. The variable costs are directly connected to each recruit, such as 
costs for issuance of clothing and pay and allowances for each enlistee. 
When the Army calculates its cost, or advertising investment, per recruit who 
reported to basic training, it includes the costs of advertising, leasing recruiting 
facilities, joint advertising and market research, recruiter cars, supplies, and 
recruiter and support personnel salaries. The figures also include recruit enlistment 
bonuses and college fund expenses. These figures do not include the cost of 
transporting recruits to and from basic training or the cost of housing, feeding, 
clothing, and paying the recruits while they are at basic training. According to U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD) figures, it costs between $8,900 and $12,400 to 
recruit and train an applicant through basic training (Military Recruitment, 1999). 
The Army's costs are historically higher than the other services due its 
extraordinarily high advertising costs associated with getting an applicant to basic 
training. These figures suggest that the Army could significantly reduce its costs per 
recruit by attracting more recruits per dollar spent. 
In other words, if the Army could identify high-payoff segments where it could 
focus its scarce advertising budget, the Army should be able to successfully attract 
a higher number of high-quality applicants for every dollar spent. 
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ANNEX 2: THE FIVE PATTERNS OF TARGET MARKETING 
^ ■ Sínflle-Seflment Concentrstion. The compsny selects s single 
segment and seeks to dominate the competition in this segment. 
Concentrated marketing involves higher than normal risks given that 
ali of the fimrTs business is in a single segment that could take a 
sudden downturn. 
2- Selective—Specialízatíon. Here the firm selects a number of 
segments, each one attractive and appropriate, given the firrrTs 
objectives and resources. There may or may not be synergy among 
the segments, but this strategy diversifies the firm's risk. 
3. Product Specíalization. Here the firm concentrates its efforts on 
making a certain product or service that it sells to several different 
segments. With this strategy, the firm attempts to build a strong 
reputation in the specific product area. There is the risk that the firrrTs 
one product could be supplanted by an entirely new product or 
technology. 
4.—Market Specialízatíon. Here the firm concentrates on serving many 
needs of a particular segment or customer group. The firm gaíns a 
strong reputation with this" customer group by specializing in serving 
its particular needs. The downside risk of this strategy is that the 
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customer groups disappears, decreases in size, or suffers a loss in 
/ 
purchasing power. 
5. Full Market Coveraqe. Here the firm is attempting to serve ali 
customer groups with ali the products that they may need. Only 
extremely large firms can ever hope to undertake effectively such a 
strategy. 
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16. ANNEX 3: THE 50 CUSTOM SEGMENTS DEFINED 
1 Upper Crust These are families with older children located in the 
suburbs, They have very high leveis of income and education and work in 
executive, managerial and other Professional occupations. 
2 Lap of Luxury These are family home owners, with children, livíng in the 
suburbs. They have a very high levei of income and education and work in sales 
and other white collar occupations. Many households contain two or more workers. 
3 Established Wealth These are families with and without children. They 
are typically home owners located in suburban areas. They have very high leveis 
of income and education and work in white collar, executive and managerial 
occupations. 
4 Mid-Life Success These are households with very high incomes living in 
suburban areas. They are home owners with very high property values, primarily 
working in white collar occupations such as sales. 
5 Prosperous Metro Míx These are typically married couples with young 
children, living in suburban and urban areas. They have high income and 
education leveis, are home owners and work in white collar occupations. 
6 Good Family Life These are typically high income, married couples with 
children. They live in rural areas and live in owner-occupied, single family detached 
units. They have a high levei of education and work in white collar occupations. 
7 Comfortable Times These are typically high income households, with 
slightly older than average married couples, with and without children. They live in 
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the suburbs. own their home. have a high levei of education and work in white collar 
occupations. 
8 Movers and Shakers These are typically households containing singles 
and couples. with two workers and no children. They live in the suburbs and some 
urban areas and have high leveis of education and income. 
9 Buílding a Home Life These are typically married couples, with children, 
living in owner-occupied, detached single famlly units. They have a medium-high 
income levei and live in rural and suburban areas. 
10 Home Sweet Home These households are typically married couples 
with one or no children at home. They have an above average household income, 
own their home and are primarily concentraled in lhe suburbs. 
11 Family Ties These households are generally familíes with children, 
living in suburban areas in the west. They have a medium-high levei of income, 
have attended some college and live in houses built between 1960 and 1979. 
12 A Good Step Forward These are typically 22 lo 34 year olds living in 
non-family households with one or two people. They are concenlrated in urban 
areas, are renters, have a high household income and very high per capita income. 
13 Succcssful Singles These are renter-occupied, non-family households, 
usually containing one person and sometimes two, located in urban areas. They 
have very high income and education leveis and white collar occupations. 
14 Middle Years This segmenl has a high income levei, a high 
concenlration of people 45 to 59 years of age, and typically work in white collar 
occupations. They are slightly above the national average in owner-occupied units 
in the suburbs. 
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15 Great Beginnings Households with one or two young adults. renting in 
urban and suburban areas. Their household income is slightly higher than average, 
as is the percent that have college degrees and white collar occupations. 
16 Country Home Familíes These are typically married families with 
children, located in rural areas. They have a household income very near the 
national average, own their home and work in blue collar occupations 
17 Stars and Strípes These are typically young families with a relatively 
large number of children. They live in urban and some suburban areas, have 
household incomes around the national average and work in blue collar 
occupations. 
18 White Picket Fence These are typically suburban families with one or 
two children. They have household incomes around the national average, live in 
owner-occupied housing and work in blue collar occupations. 
19 Young and Carefree This segment consists primarily of young adults 
without children. They are typically one and two person households renting in 
urban and suburban areas. They have a medium-high income levei and white 
collar occupations. 
20 Secure Adults Older singles and couples, living in the suburbs with no 
children and a household income near the national average. Typically home 
owners, living in single unit detached or mobile homes. 
21 American Classics These are older singles and couples, living in 
suburban and rural areas. They are both home owners and renters, with incomes 
near the national average, medium-low education with a high percenlage receiving 
retirement income. 
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22 Traditional Times This segment is comprised of singles and couples, 
some with one or two children. with medium-low leveis of income and education. 
They live in suburban areas, in owner-occupied units and work in blue collar 
occupations. 
23 Settled In These are primarily older couples, with no children in the 
household, or single person households. They live in suburban areas, have 
médium leveis of income and education and a high likelihood of being retired. 
24 City Ties These are families with a relatively large number of older 
children. They live primarily in urban areas and have medium-low income and 
education leveis. They íend to have blue collar occupations and take public 
transportation to work. 
25 Bedrock America This segment consists of families with children, 
located primarily in rural areas. They have low income and education leveis, are 
home owners with low property value and work in blue collar occupations. 
26 The Mature Years These households are singles and couples, with and 
without children. located in suburban and some rural areas. They have low income 
and education leveis, work in blue collar occupations and have low property values 
and rent leveis. 
27 Middle of the Road This segment consists primarily of households with 
children, located in rural areas. They have medium-low income and low education 
leveis and work in blue collar occupations, especially farming, forestry and fishing. 
28 Building a Family These are slightly younger than average households, 
with children, located in rural areas and living in older homes. They have low 
income. property value and education leveis and work in blue collar occupations. 
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29 Establishlng Roots These are primarily families with large numbers of 
/ 
children, located in rural areas and living in older homes. They have low income, 
property value and education leveis and work in blue collar occupations. 
30 Domestic Duos This segment consists primarily of seniors, with one or 
two people in the residence, located in suburban areas. They live in multi-unit 
housing, have a medium-low income levei and a relatively large percentage receive 
retirement income, 
31 Country Classics These are owner-occupied households, containing 
mature couples and few children. They live in rural areas, have low household 
incomes and work in blue collar occupations. 
32 Metro Síngles This segment consists of households containing 
relatively young singles, some couples and few children. They are typically renters, 
located in urban areas, with medium-low incomes working in administrative and 
blue collar occupations. 
33 Living Off The Land These are married couples, many with children, 
located in rural areas. They are typically low income home owners, living in older 
houses with a low property value. 
34 Books and New Recruíts This segment consists of young, single 
adults, living in rental or group housing, in urban and suburban areas. They have 
ãbove average education and medium-low income leveis and many work in white 
collar occupations. 
35 Buy American These are married families, many with children, living in 
»uburban and rural areas. Most are home owners with low property value and 
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household income. working in blue collar occupations. Relatively few have 
education beyond high school. 
36 Metro Mix Typically young singles, living in non-family households, 
located in urban areas. Primarily renters with medium-low income, little college 
education, working in administrative support and service occupations. 
37 Urban Up and Comers This segment consists of singles, primarily living 
alone, in rental property. They live in urban areas, have a high levei of education, 
medium-high income and work in white collar occupations. 
38 Rustic Homesteaders These are primarily rural households, containing 
married, middle aged adults, with older children. They have little education beyond 
high school, low income and work in blue collar occupations. 
39 On Thelr Own These are typically young adults and seniors, living in 
renter-occupied households, located in urban and suburban areas. These 
households typically contain one to two persons, have a low levei of income and 
many work in white collar specialty and blue collar service occupations. 
40 Trying Metro Times This segment typically consists of young single 
adults with young children, and seniors, located in urban and suburban areas. They 
are mostly renters, with low income and education and blue collar occupations. 
41 Close-Knít Familles These are urban households, with relatively young 
adults and a large number of children. They are typically renters, with very low 
income, little education, working in blue collar occupations. 
42 Trying Rural Times These are rural households with a large number of 
children. They are primarily home owners, with very low incomes, little education, 
working in blue collar occupations. 
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43 Manufacturlng USA This segment consists of very low income 
/ 
households located in urban and suburban areas. They are young adults and 
seniors, many with children, living in renter-occupied housing. They have low leveis 
of education and work in the service sector and other blue collar occupations. 
44 Hard Years This segment contains primarily young adults and seniors, 
renting in urban areas. They have very low income and education leveis, live in 
multi-family dwelling units and work in blue collar occupations. 
45 Struggling Metro Mix These households are typically young singles, 
renting in urban areas. They have relatively few children, a low levei of income, 
lower than average education and many employed in service posiíions. 
46 Díffícult Times These are primarily families with a relatively large 
number of children, They have very low income and education leveis, and are 
mostly renters and work in the service sector and other blue collar occupations. 
47 University USA These are typically young singles with very low 
incomes, living in non-family households and group quarters, located in urban 
areas. Many are currently in college, living in one or two person households, in 
structures with ten or more units. 
48 Urban Singles Primarily young adults and seniors, renting in urban 
areas. They are single occupant households with few children living in structures 
with over 50 units. They have a very low income levei and a less than average 
levei of education. 
49 Anomalies & 50 Unclassified Non-homogenous segments which 
should not be included in a marketing plan. 
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